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Introduction 
The Christian dream of heaven with its sexless angels and insipid harps betrays 
the most appalling lack of imagination, moral and aesthetic…they would trust 
enjoy their heaven while the mass of mankind suffers ceaseless torments. Some 
trust that the spectacle of endless tortures will increase their bliss, while others, 
priding themselves on their greater sensitivity, feel quite certain that their 
ecstasy in heaven will preclude any remembrance of the sufferings of the 
damned.
1
 
       
 “Only in the chorus might a certain truth be found”2 
    In the ‘Prologue’ to his work Tragedy and Philosophy, Walter Kaufmann wonders whether 
the most strongly-held Christian images hold up to the times in the context of suffering, fear 
and pity. One might see it as a particular challenge for Christian thought and practice—
particularly in the 21
st
 century context—to take seriously the query: what do our aesthetic 
resources say about how we view ourselves as Christian community, our connection to past, 
present and future, and our relationship and responsibility to the world? Do our artistic 
resources accurately portray something of the human condition which our sense of mission 
calls us into? 
 
     Miguel de Unamuno, Dietrich Bonhoeffer and John Macmurray are three male, European 
theologians who were concerned with the problem of impersonality which revealed itself in 
the critical transformations of 20th century society. The sensitivity of the arts—the practice of 
the arts, the perception of the arts and the experience of the arts — is central to their pursuit 
to cultivate a personalised sense of Christian meaning, and thus an embodied Christianity. 
This dissertation seeks to consider their engagement with theology and the arts and how 
Christian community is perceived in this engagement. Their deliberate proximity to the 
demise of Christendom and the precariousness of the 20
th
 century world, make their 
philosophical and theological perspectives particularly relevant to understanding the value of 
finding meaning in the traumas of history. Particularly in the Christian imagination—that is, 
theology’s conversation and convergence with the world — these thinkers represent the 
aesthetic tasks of not merely describing the Christian meaning,  but Christian aesthetically 
relevant to the construction of meaning theology and as of human action and reflection.  
                                                          
1
 W. Kaufmann (1968), Tragedy and Philosophy. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, xx. 
 
2
 Franz Kafka, quoted in S. Corngold (ed. R. Felski 2008), Rethinking Tragedy. Baltimore: JHU Press, 236. 
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They might be loosely characterised as the bohemian theologians: the Basque Unamuno 
seeks to re-imagine the essence of Christianity in opposition to the stronghold of Spanish 
Catholicism, whilst Bonhoeffer’s Christianity has as its basis the post-pietistic German 
Reformed liberalism, and Macmurray’s more eclectic spiritual journey begins within a 
staunch Calvinist Presbyterian background and concludes within the Society of Friends. 
Though their spiritualties vary, they share a consensus in emphasising the centrality of “art” 
in the construction of community and the “personal” reflective life.  
 
Unamuno’s philosophy and literature affirms the tragic as recognition of a trans-historical 
reality, where the sufferings, jealousies and anxieties of human consciousness persistently 
pierce at the soul, challenging one’s relation to God. Bonhoeffer struggles to imagine 
Christianity after Nazism as offering a redemptive reservoir in a “worldly” rather than 
pietistic context; but rather than presenting dogmatic alternatives, he offers musical 
metaphors and the experience of music as instruments of celebrating the dark qualities of the 
human spirit and, thus, brings to view a more honest, and revitalised Christian faith. 
Macmurray’s philosophy of “personal relation” depends upon the power of art to shape the 
emotions and creative rather than idealist religion as a prime reserve for thought and action, 
shares as we will argue, affinities with the development of the tragic idea in 20
th
 century 
religious consciousness. 
 
Personalism  
 
     A crucial thread in understanding these three and their relation to one another is their 
proximity to the personalist turn in theological thought in the first half of the 20
th
 century. 
The theistic exploration of reality in light of the unity of relations, and thus a liminal self 
lived ‘in community’ went by the name personalism. In the West, the personalist ‘project’ 
found a conversation partner in the more notable Jamesean pragmatic philosophy of personal 
identity, grounded as the both are not by the presence of a “soul” but in the sequence of one’s 
experiences guaranteed by memory.
3
  
 
                                                          
3
 R. Crawford (2011), The Battle for the Soul: A Comparative Analysis in an age of doubt. London: Palgrave 
Macmillan, 159. 
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Macmurray describes the religious dimensions of personalism in his most aesthetically 
inclined work, Reason and Emotion: “…shall treat personality, and the relations of persons in 
love as sacred and to be reverenced, and nothing else. Whatever is impersonal must not be 
reverenced or treated as sacred. . . .To do so is to be idolatrous, to worship as God what is not 
God. And to treat what is personal impersonally is to pollute a holy thing.”4 Personalism’s 
proximity in the 20
th
 century was not in the academy alone: it was the inspiration in many 
nations for social change in an era in which an alternative to Empire and the economics of 
Progress at best necessitated a poetic framework for articulating the meaning—for 20th 
century purposes at least—of what it means not only to be human, but a creative human being 
in community. With this in mind, I would still like to take seriously the personalist project and 
to further understand the aesthetic relevance of personalism to how we make meaning in our 
artistic resources. 
 
The Arena of Agony 
 
Within the personalist universe, ‘The Tragic’ takes on an integrative role in that human 
nature is not merely poetic mimicry; it is representative of real human existence. A 
satisfactory definition of tragedy has been called the “Holy Grail of literary theory”. 5  
Indeed, the idea of the tragic has had an elusive existence throughout Western history—one 
moment a signifier of a chaotic society and, as a result, a provider of ethical reflection; the 
next moment, it is a piece of pessimism from the past with little meaning for a society “at 
peace”.  
 
For a religion whose central acts of practicing and symbolising its central principles 
include wine and bread as sacraments, cultivating and sustaining the hospitality of 
community, and a yearning for a dialogue with the world (which sometimes has meant a 
domination of that world “for Christ”), that Christian faith and practice has been seen as 
incompatible with the arena of tragedy is perhaps surprising to a ‘worldly’, 21st century 
Christian. The consensus has been that Christianity is an inherently anti-tragic view of the 
world, often offering dogmatism and triumphalism as responses to a world in crisis. The idea 
of the tragic further loses intrigue in a “postmodern” context where almost everything 
                                                          
4
 Macmurray, Introduction to Reason and Emotion, p.xv. 
5
 H. Brenton, “Freedom in Chaos”. The Guardian, 21 September 2002. 
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‘pathetic’ or unfortunate is denoted as tragic or, at its most banal, ‘the end of the world as we 
know it’—from a global economic meltdown to the untimely death of a child, or the death of 
a drug-poisoned celebrity.  
 
    The arena of tragedy, however, is much broader than the scenery of ‘the pathetic’ could 
interpret. In the 20
th
 century thinkers such as Max Scheler and A. N. Whitehead affirm the 
tragic as rooted in the world’s makeup and thus, as crucial to theological reflection and 
reformation. Scheler, from whom Bonhoeffer gleaned a developing theory of personhood, 
understands that a full assessment of the tragic takes for granted that its presence can be 
found in all artistic products: “We see the tragic only when in one glance we embrace both 
the causality of things and the exigencies of their immanent values…the result is a clear 
insight into the independence of these two things. It is here that we may see the formal 
‘background’ of all tragedies.” 6  Whitehead, who adds a third to the “trinity” made of 
pragmatism, personalism and process, as well as one of Macmurray’s philosophical allies, 
sees the tragic, at best, as a process of maturity: 
 
At the heart of the nature of things, there are always the dream of youth and 
the harvest of tragedy. The Adventure of the universe starts with the dream 
and reaps tragic Beauty. This is the secret of the union of Zest with Peace—
that the suffering attains its end in a Harmony of Harmonies. The immediate 
experiences of this Final Fact, with its union of Youth and Tragedy, is the 
sense of Peace. In this way the world received its persuasion towards such 
perfections as are possible for its diverse individual occasions.
7
 
 
     “Tragedy” (goat song in Greek) is draped with religious meaning in classical thought.8 
The term suggests ritual sacrifice, the celebration of grape harvest — all civic activities of 
Ancient Greece.
9
 The drama of the tragic play was at once an imitation of the spectacle of 
fate, and an encounter by the community as both spectators to the drama and agents of the 
                                                          
6
 Scheler, quoted in V Lambropoulos (2006), The Tragic Idea. London: Duckworth, 115-116. 
 
7
 Whitehead (1933), Adventures of Ideas. Cambridge: University Press, 296. 
 
8
 T. Eagleton (2002), Sweet Violence: The Idea of the Tragic. London: Blackwell, 274. 
 
9
 Ibid. 
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world around it.
10
 Athenaeus of Naucratis suggested that it was under the “consequence” of 
wine and the public spectacle that comedy and tragedy were first intertwined.
11
  Carl Jung 
affirmed, with Nietzsche, that tragedy represents the reconciliation of reality from a distance 
(Apollonian philosophy) with a complete immersion into reality (Dionysian philosophy). 
Unlike Nietzsche, however, Jung insisted that tragedy was not an aesthetic issue only, but a 
response to a trauma which was existential and religious in nature.
12
 I pursue this study of 
Unamuno, Bonhoeffer and Macmurray with the assumption that one can still find space for 
conversation in the meanings inherent in hospitality and community as ritualistic practices. 
 
The role of the chorus, as a collective voice of the deeper complexity of ethical decisions, 
reveals tragedy as a moral exercise, an “imitation of action” which relates thought and 
character to experience.
13
 As Goldhill has asserted, in the ancient tragic consciousness, “the 
theatre was a space in which all the citizens were actors—as the city itself and its leading 
citizens were put on display.”14  It is a person-centred art-form where the whole of human 
experience are bound in the inspiration of “fear or pity”.15 Here the chorus are not placed in 
the drama for mere “rhythm”, but are actively important in the sequence of events; they are 
both “spectators” and “protagonists”.16   
 
One thinks of the tragic drama and imagines a scene not unlike cultures for whom Shrove 
Tuesday are opportunities to be part of the actions of the day. Beyond this, to what extent is 
Christian practice, whether in worship or service to the world, preserving something of the 
spectacle of community? The concern for community and personhood which Unamuno, 
                                                          
10
 R. Felski (2008), Rethinking Tragedy. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins, 128-129. 
 
11
 “It is in consequence of wine that both comedy and tragedy were discovered in Icarium, a village of Attica; 
and it was at the time of the grape harvest that these inventions were first introduced, from which comedy 
was first called .” Athanaesius (trans. C D Yonge 1857), The Deipnosophists, or, Banquet of the 
Learned of Athenaeus. London: H G Bohn, 65-66. 
 
12
 T. van den Berk (2012),  Jung on Art: The Autonomy of the Creative Drive. London: Routledge, 69. 
 
13
 T.R. Henn (1956), The Harvest of Tragedy. London: Methuen, 1. 
 
14
 S Goldhill (ed P. Easterling, 1997), The Cambridge Companion to Greek Tragedy. Cambridge University Press, 
56.  
 
15
 Aristotle’s Poetics Book IX, quoted in Henn, Ibid. 
 
16
 Ibid. 
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Bonhoeffer and Macmurray give support to the pervasiveness of the tragic which renders it a 
place in the experiences of community and social transformation. 
 
Chapter Outline 
 
    I will begin with Miguel de Unamuno’s agonic Christianity in the historical context of 
post-imperial Spain. An important theme in Unamuno’s thought is the nature of identity 
beyond “ontological security”. Torn between the materialist meaning of religion and a quest 
for “immortality”, his ideas of the liminality of history frames his theological exploration of 
identity and belief. “The man of flesh and bone” is characterised by the one who dares to go 
on a journey of individuation or meaning lives, in anguish, to decide how one shall endure. 
He ultimately suggests an active resignation which will not only embrace inward struggle as 
the essence of personhood but will recognize the same anguish in the lives of other people. I 
aim to weave his religious philosophy with his novels—not always understood in concert 
with each other— to provide a basis for his sense of the tragic.  
 
    Dietrich Bonhoeffer’s ‘theological angst’ is interrelated to his well-informed interest of 
aesthetics and how central a role both have in shaping Christian witness as well as culture. 
Because of his bourgeois upbringing and in spite of it, Bonhoeffer’s writings also an 
understanding that the crisis of Art is linked with the crisis of Religion, in any context. He 
will provide a clear understanding of the “prophetic” nature of the tragic and how tragedy 
relates to understanding Bonhoeffer’s Christology and aesthetic. Bonhoeffer’s engagement 
with African American culture was not simply cursory, but it served as a space where he 
could engage honestly with the underpinnings of art and Word. Ultimately the prevalence of 
a ‘polyphonic’ theological aesthetic over a bourgeois neo-classicism underpins his pursuit, 
even in prison, for a Christian imagination which best represents a “mature”, “worldly” 
Christianity.  
 
    We shall then explore John Macmurray’s view of the centrality of religion in light of 
“personal relation” and how it relates to tragic consciousness. He reflects on the conversation 
between the spiritual, intellectual and aesthetic selves as problematical, but necessary for the 
cultivation of communion. Early in his thought Macmurray is interested in the meaning and 
relation of art as part of a conversation of conflicts between itself, science and religion. Art is 
concerned with the exhibition of values and, in relation to action, with the choice of ends. It is 
 7 
 
an education of emotion and training in judgement. The cultivation of the arts—that activity 
where we take the world as matter of fact for granted but go on to contemplate it from the 
standpoint of its intrinsic value—is crucial for educating and maturing one’s emotions. The 
thread which brings Macmurray’s logic together is his ‘familial’ metaphor which he called 
the rhythm of withdrawal and return. Though not influenced directly by him, Macmurray 
shares with Martin Buber an understanding of the fellowship of difference which is traumatic 
and inevitable. It is in the encounter with fear that one comes to discover freedom.  
 
    Having developed the influence of tragic consciousness in the vision of Unamuno, 
Bonhoeffer and Macmurray, in the concluding chapter I will suggest the implications for 
dialogue between the tragic sense of life and the Christian imagination in light of a 
“postmodern” climate tempered by the persistent re-enactment – mimesis – of the traumas of 
human experience. 
 
 8 
 
CHAPTER ONE 
Unamuno and Agonic Christianity 
One night there lowered into my mind one of those dark, sad, and mournful 
dreams which I cannot banish from my thoughts, even during moments of 
happiness during the day. I dreamed that I was married, that I had a child, 
that this child died, and that over its body, which seemed to be made of wax, 
I said to my wife: “behold our love! Shortly it will decay: this is the way 
everything ends.
1
 
Ordinarily what I dislike most in others are the same qualities I dislike in 
myself, and if I am wounded by the barb of a fellow man, it is because the 
same barb is stabbing my own insides.
2
 
    The disturbing dream told above in a letter to his future wife Concepcion a short while 
before their marriage in 1891, is not only an ominous foretelling of Miguel de Unamuno’s 
personal future; the later trauma in the death of his third son in 1897 would eventually deepen 
his embrace of death as more than historical or political—but intrinsically spiritual. 
Unamuno’s ‘dream’ also serves as an early manifestation of the imminent question in his 
broad aesthetic language: “what is to become of consciousness after each one of us dies”3.  
     Later, and unlike most of his literary and artistic contemporaries — famously known as 
“The Generation of 1898” — the crisis of religion and the resolve of  an interpersonal, active 
resignation would be a haunting theme of Unamuno’s philosophical, poetic and literary 
output. Initially concerned about the particular transformation of Spanish culture after the last 
throes of imperial might had manifested itself, Unamuno ultimately considers the essence of 
tragic existence an issue in the broader context of Western crisis of authority and the collapse 
of European colonialism. At the time he wrote that chilling letter to his “Chonca”, he was a 
                                                          
1
 Quoted in A. Lacy (1984), “introduction” in The Private World: Selections from the Diario Intimo, 1890-1936.  
Princeton, NJ: University Press, xxxi. 
 
2
 “Sobre la Soberbia”(1904), OC 1: 1205. 
 
3
 Unamuno (1905), “Solitude” in Ensayos. 
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fledgling University lecturer with more of a commitment to science and positivism than 
toward religion.
4
  
 
     However, Unamuno’s aesthetic and philosophical emphasis on the tragic “sentiment” in 
human existence is a response to the context of the increasing reliance on a ‘positivist’ 
ideology in European thought, and the obsolescence of Catholic dominance in post-imperial 
Spain. “The childish confidence that it is granted to us to discover truth”, he says, “has long 
since disappeared; as we progress we become aware of the difficulties that lie in the way of 
its discovery and of the limitation of our powers.”5 Unamuno’s discovery of the problem of 
consciousness in the context of immortality will serve as the uniting feature in his thought, 
and aggravate the tensions between faith, history, and materialist thought which guide his 
writings. By attacking what was the nerve centre of Spanish culture in the Catholic Church, 
Unamuno refused to imagine Spanish life without religion; rather, his pursuit was to to 
explore the existential ‘trauma’ caused by the “neat simplicities”6  of orthodoxy, and the 
limitations of modernity which this existential trauma reveals. In the end, he concludes that 
the “dream” of faith—to wish to “possess” rather than be detached from God— is expressed 
in the tragic union of love and suffering.
7
   
 
 
The ‘theological’ perspective to Unamuno has can best be expressed as “religious 
philosophy”; this is the designation A.R.C. Duncan8 gives to the thought of John Macmurray. 
For Unamuno, the philosophical, political and aesthetic enterprise of his thought includes 
religion as a pivotal concern.
9
 Unamuno cites Kierkegaard as a philosophical “brother” in a 
time when the Dane’s work was just recently being discovered. Yet whilst Kierkegaard 
                                                          
4
 Lacy, xii-xiii. 
 
5
 Unamuno (1912, trans. C. Fitch), Tragic Sense of Life. New York: Dover, 145. 
 
6
 Lacy, xxiv.  
 
7
 TSL, 218-19. 
 
8
 As noted in E. McIntosh (2011), John Macmurray’s Religious Philosophy: What it Means to be a Person. 
London: Ashgate, 5. 
 
9
 “…whereas the logical analysis of a philosophy of religion can be carried out without necessitating any 
personal religious experience or belief.” Ibid. 
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insists that the aesthetic, ethical and religious worlds as stages on one’s existential journey, 
with religion serving only God and with a lack of concern for the social manifestation of 
faith,
10
 Unamuno’s agony is how “social Christianity”—that is, an imposed religion on 
society— limits the human “hunger” for God, not as “irrefragable truth, but as a working 
hypothesis”.11 As Weinstein observes, Unamuno’s thought, which takes the shape of many 
spheres of human life and religion as a significant sphere intersecting all the others, 
represents an inquiry of the spiritual ‘costs’ of modern life.12 This chapter is an attempt at 
taking a cursory glance through a selection of Unamuno’s religious philosophy and novella of 
his perspective of the proximity of the sense of the tragic integral to Christian faith.   
 
 
Unamuno and Realism 
Born in the Basque country, Unamuno described his aesthetic universe as the consequence 
of a series of “spiritual crises”. He was 10 years of ages during the bombardment of his 
hometown Bilbao during the Carlist War of 1873-74, the national crisis which signalled the 
beginning of the end of Spanish imperialism. 21 February 1874 was recalled by Unamuno: 
“before that date, I keep only fragmentary memories; after it comes the thread of my 
history.”13 The explosion of a Carlist bomb and the smoke in the air came to symbolise the 
first tension in Unamuno’s sense of the tragic, “that it was possible to talk about ‘the 
others’—the ones belonging to another faction—while acknowledging that these ‘others’ 
were no less Spanish than themselves”.14   
 
Unamuno placed Catholicism to the side in University whilst developing a positivist and 
scientific point of view. Unamuno’s early years were described as a combination of both 
deep, personal examination and philosophical searching. “Deeply emotional and 
                                                          
10
 O.A. Fasel (1955), “Observations on Unamuno and Kierkegaard” in Hispania 38:4, 443, 448. 
 
11
 M. Nozick (1971), Miguel de Unamuno.  New York: Twayne Publishers, 65. 
 
12
 M.A. Weinstein (1976), “Unamuno and the Agonies of Modernisation” in The Review of Politics, 38:1, 40. 
 
13
 A. Lacy (1983), “Introduction”, Peace in War. Princeton University Press, xi. 
 
14
 J F Mora (2003), Three Spanish Philosophers: Unamuno, Ortega and Ferrater Mora. Albany, NY; SUNY Press, 
21. 
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intellectually curious... Sometimes, he cried without an explanation; on others, he would fall 
sleep with a book in his hands.”15  
 
Unamuno came of age when the political idea of Dos Espana was most heightened, almost 
as a form of security against the inevitable end of imperialism. These ‘Two Spains’ were, on 
the one hand, the movement of the ‘traditionalists’, the casticistas, who sought to maintain 
the purity of Spanish culture and religion, in particular keeping Spanish Catholicism 
untainted by Modern influence throughout the continent.
16
  The other Spain was that of the 
Krausian progressives’, with Julian Sanz del Rio’s (1814-1869) interpretation of the work of 
late- Enlightenment thinker Karl Friedrich Kraus (1781-1832) being the most radical import 
to Spanish universities in the mid-19
th
 century.
17
 These progressives and their thought, known 
as “regenerationismo” sought to broaden religious ideals as informing all practical effort 
rather than settling into religious dogma and revelation.
18
 This perspective of religion for the 
progressives was a reaction against the political powers of the Church, powers that dogma 
justified and made the practice of religion little more than formality.
19
 Although a strong 
emphasis on ethics, a cosmopolitan vision for Europe and its resonance if not a call for a 
reclamation of Catholic moral ethics (i.e. an organic vision of society, a concern with social 
rights and a belief in God) caught the attention of Iberian culture and its colonies, 
traditionalism ultimately won the day.
20
  
 
    A growing third way interrupted the two nationalities, these two perceptions of how Spain 
was conceived in the minds of the intellectuals and artists. European positivism parallels the 
presence of realism in art, which ultimately shapes much of the Generation of ’98. Realism 
                                                          
15
 K B Fagan (2004), “The Teenage Dissent of Newman and Unamuno: Conscience as a Safeguard Against 
Coercive Manipulation” in Cultic Studies Review 3;3. 
 
16
 M. Nozick, Unamuno: The Agony of Belief. New York: Twane Publishers, 1971, 79. 
 
17
 Ibid. 
 
18
 Carlos Stoetzer (1998), Karl Fredrich Krause and his Influence in the Hispanic World. Cologne: Boehlau Verlag. 
 
19
 R. Gott (2002), Karl Kraus and the Ideological origins of the Cuban Revolution. University of London Institute 
of Latin American Studies, 4-6. 
 
20
Ibid. 
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and the Realist novel seeks to provide a fictional model of the real world, replicating the 
laws, conditions and circumstances of the common world. Fantastical illusions are intrusions 
for a realist method of imagination. John Macklin describes the consequences of aesthetic 
realism for religious experience: 
For the deeply religious person, this world may be merely a simulacrum of a 
supernatural reality, which itself must be accepted as part of the 
real...Realist writers are generally critical of bourgeois society, the very 
audience for whom they write. This could, and usually did, involve 
criticisms of conventional morality and usually the main theme of such 
fiction was the clash between individual aspiration and the constraints of 
society. It is not for nothing that a very characteristic theme is the woman 
taken in adultery, for this theme highlights not only the role of women in a 
patriarchal society but also society’s repression of individual desire.21  
 
Intrahistoria 
An understanding of these “traditions” of thought and their manifestations in the Spanish 
consciousness is crucial to understanding how Unamuno is interested early on in the 
interpretations of history and how the human consequences of them. Thus, he first introduces 
in his series of 1895 essays En Torno al Casticismo (On Authentic Tradition) a process of 
paradoxes which he calls intrahistoria, intra-consciente, and la tradicion eterna. Through 
these terms he seeks to establish the depths of authenticity in light of the decadent and 
ultimately disastrous route of the Spanish nationalistic consciousness before and after the loss 
of her Empire. He uses the metaphor of the sea, “upon whose surface the waves rise and fall 
and succeed one another.”22 This image permits the development and decay of an idea, a 
‘discreet impression’ which serves only to give a moment of continuity. Life is, then, a series 
of deaths, and one is has to decipher the overwhelming reality of the compound narratives, 
what he calls the legacy of the ages.
23
 It is the difference between what occurs and what 
                                                          
21
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history records, the contrast between the lived experiences against the unreal picture of 
history by the cultural dominants of a generation.  
 
In El Torno, Unamuno criticises the Spanish national consciousness as driven by 
disassociation and lacking in cohesion and continuity of values.
24
 The reality that history can 
be controlled by overt and conscious purposes cultivates a tradition of intellectual 
slothfulness. As Unamuno says of his own people in this narrow historical context, “Like the 
individuals who comprise Spain, our society is characterised by its lengthy reaction time; in 
spite of a superficial impressionability, which is really nothing more than an irritation of the 
epidermis, the Spaniard is difficult to stimulate”25. A narrow historical consciousness, in 
Unamuno’s view, creates a cultural vacuum. Thus, the idea of traditionalism as both a 
political construct in Spain and as a cultural and spiritual expression is scrutinised as archaic, 
exclusive and triumphalist. Tradition doesn’t define history, but rather history as a continuing 
saga in time, which defines tradition. 
 
A distinguishing feature of Unamuno’s intrahistoria is in how Umanumo imagines 
unconscious personality as linked with the sea and the universal feminine.  “Woman is the 
foundation of tradition in organised societies, she provides calm in the midst of turbulence, 
peace in times of conflict.”26 For this many have associated Unamuno with his contemporary 
Jung.
27
 So if agony does have a place in intrahistoria, it is part of a liminal process of the 
inner life.  
 
It was the Krausian influence in Spanish life that prompted Unamuno to make sense of the 
conflicts between religiousness and secular society.  As the title of his most well-known 
philosophical enquiry suggests, his concern is to express the centrality of the ‘tragic 
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sentiment’ in human existence. Though there have been many attempts to emphasise his 
philosophical output in concert with the forebodings of existentialism, the intention in all of 
his philosophical writings is to find synergy with his literary output, most specifically in the 
development of the modern novel or, for him what he coined the nivola.  
 
In the introduction to the last edition of Mist published in his lifetime, Unamuno 
distinguishes the nivola from the novel, liking the latter to a huge piece of historical 
architecture. “Basilicas make themselves, jumping over any plans thought out in advance, 
using the workers’ very hands as their tools in self-creation.”28 The grandness of the novels’ 
world imposes itself upon the reader and the author. Unamuo envisioned the nivola as a 
writing process similar to biblical narrative. It is not a realist world, with dates, times and a 
metanarrative of major ‘heroes’ and omniscient narrators, but a world likened to the 
narratives of faith in which “Lucifer and Satan, and later Adam and Eve, impose themselves 
on Jehovah”.29 They do not seek to give a picture of the entire world to the reader; rather, 
nivolas are concentrated on the “tragic agonisers”30, the ironies and paradoxes which are 
imposed not simply on the larger world, but the spiritual, psychological, and cultural self—
the multiplicity of one’s’ identity. 
 
Peace in War 
His first and most conventional novel, Peace in War (Paz in la Guerra, 1897), is 
Unamuno’s first literary manifestation of intrahistoria. In it he depicts the struggle of personal 
loyalties during the Third Carlist War, which historically sealed the end of Spanish imperial 
rule and likewise disasterous and lasting effects on the Spanish psyche. A work which 
anticipates Erich Remarques All Quiet on the Western Front (1928), it is not history in a 
sense that it depicts the major characters essential to the fixed idea of history, but rather 
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details the experiences of those associated only form a distance, but caught up in the 
overwhelming, ‘agonic’ political, cultural and religious narratives which ultimately scar for 
life.  
 
Ignatio Antonio, the tragic main character, is compelled away from a modest small town 
life of people fulfilling their civic expectations, of which military service is one, into fighting 
for the Carlist Army. His motivation for entering the army, to defend traditional values and 
hope to be part of a “great battle”,31 is ultimately challenged when he realises that the life of 
military “discipline”—mass drills even in the “free mountains”32—did little to prepare them 
for the courage needed on the battlefield.  The journey of war, through “ancient rocky 
causeways” and “old riverbeds”33 was further complicated by the conflicts of ideas which 
meet the army along the war journey: contradictory reports of the progress of the war, the 
spectacle of propaganda, the momentary union between Republicans and Carlists
34 —all 
amounted to a conflict of loyalties. Like the many causeways and riverbeds they are passing 
through, life and war begins to “resemble one another” for Ignacio.35  
 
    The zenith of Ignacio’s cause for reflection in the battle occurs in the campaign against a 
guerrilla army led by a local priest. With the sight of “Pious crusaders with pure souls” led by 
the idiosyncratic personality of a “warrior-priest…devout general…terrorist priest…military 
man who believed in rosary beads”36, Ignacio realises that those whom he must fight with and 
fight against—whether aristocrats or peasants, religious or secular—form a true tragic unity. 
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They together form “the stilled voice of dead centuries of ancient feuds”,37 the unresolved 
tensions which collide in the field of any battle. 
That whole popular movement surging out of the depths of the people, out 
of that formless and protoplasmic mass from which nations are made, all 
that movement rising up out of a people—would it be possible to mould that 
mass into a military pattern…to systematise those armies which had grown 
out of the forging of nationalities? Would it be possible to subject that mass 
to the disciplinary hierarchy, to a subordination from grade to grade, without 
a single gap in the order? To turn those bands into an army, to make a well-
defined program out of their inarticulate aspirations?
38
  
On the battlefield, “Principles” were nothing more than “bait” luring a mass of people into 
a mission which was vague; “once in action, everything had been turned into movement,” and 
ones’ ideas were nothing until “transformed” into agency.39 But even action, particularly 
collective action where one is part of a whole, can mislead. When alone, away from the 
monotony of the nomadic life,
40
 Ignacio can further reflect on the blurred “dream” of 
combat.
41
  
 
The agony and struggle of Ignacio’s reassessment of values and surroundings parallels the 
“marches and counter-marches”,42 the frequency of ‘scores’ which this war is purported to 
settle: the rustic and the man about town, between the man of the mountain and the man of 
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the sea and his greed”.43  The loud struggle for ideas in the face of human suffering amounted 
to a paradox of scepticism.
44
  
 
    When Ignacio finds himself alone and exposed to enemy bullets, his mind is finally 
invaded with thoughts of death, moments before he is shot and killed:  
…abandoned by everyone like someone shipwrecked, with no one to stretch 
out a friendly hand. People were killing each other without wanting to, 
killing out of the fear of death…in order that some men might annihilate 
others…Death was reaping its harvest, distributing the blows of its scythe 
by sheer chance.
45
 
    Ignacio dies ingloriously as the War rolls on, eventually proving itself to be a pointless 
undertaking. The deluge in which the siege of Bilabo occurs (both the setting of the novel and 
Unamuno’s native city), with all the horror and grotesque apocalypticism the real experience 
engendered. With the people of the city “reduced to eating cats and rats, swayed by rumours, 
holding on to hopes soon shattered, caught in endless discussions about taking sides and sides 
against a mysterious brotherhood of masons, free thinkers and anti-Christ”—Pachio reflects 
on his brothers’ death, and is now left to him to understand the meaning of massacre whilst 
others around him lament only the material ramifications.  
His chief mortification, comforting and distracting him at the same time, 
was the battle waged inside himself against the evil enemy…He 
remembered the idea that men cannot know whether or not they are in sin, 
that it is not we ourselves but sin within us that commits mortal sins…The 
truth was that his inner life was endless in its variety and never bored him. 
How could all that talk about war which so much concerned other people 
compare to the intimate battle in his soul, sustained by Grace against the 
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Tempter of Men, what were all those other battles that filled the newspapers 
worth?
46
 
The parallels in Peace in War to Tolstoy’s War and Peace47 have been well discussed. The 
core of Tolstoy’s narrative is the pairing—almost caricature—of the historical personalities of 
Napoleon and the Russian commander Kutuzov, and the role of nature as depicted in the 
realities of the Russian winter. “In sum, it is the triumph of intrahistory over history… Tolstoy 
seeks at every turn to impress upon his readers the supremacy of all that is historical, and the 
futility of the merely historical.”48 However, Unamuno’s conception of intrahistory requires a 
relationship with history
49
; that is, a need to draw from unending conflict a sense of 
tranquillity.
50
  
 
Active Resignation 
So Unamuno is obsessed with the clash or encounter between personal desires and the 
‘threat’ of otherness to the self. This ‘tragic sense of life’ is more than ‘theodicy’ for 
Unamuno; it is a “tragic consolation”51 sought after by the eternal essence of love’s union 
with suffering. “The consciousness that everything passes away, that we ourselves pass away, 
and that everything that is ours and everything that environs us passes away, fills us with 
anguish, and this anguish itself reveals to us the consolation of that which does not pass 
away, of the eternal, of the beautiful.”52   
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    Unamuno’s “hunger for immortality” is an aspect of what Round calls “ontological 
security.”53 The need to be fully secure in one’s own being is in significant part based on 
Unamuno’s own personal yearnings for security, a thread which, as some scholars of 
Unamuno turning to the psychological implications of his thought suggest, stems from his 
growing up without a male influence, and the search for individuation and liberty from a 
maternal dominance.
54
  The other dimension which gives weight to this need for ontological 
security is the way the presence of conflict in human life deconstructs absolutisms. 
Abstractions and systems, such as those which produce narrow-minded historical references, 
cannot resolve immortality because consciousness itself—a “sickness” unique to, and 
universal among mankind—brings about the tension, the feeling that “whole peoples” and 
every individual feels: the tragic sense of life.
55
 Indeed consciousness—the tragic sense of 
life itself—is the middle term that makes each and every ‘man of flesh and blood’ what he is: 
For the present let us agree on this intense suspicion that the longing not to 
die, the hunger for personal immortality, the striving to persevere indefinitely 
in our own being, all of which is, according to the tragic Jew [Spinoza], our 
very essence, constitutes the affective basis of all knowledge and the 
personal inner point of departure for any and all human philosophy wrought 
by man for his fellows. And then we shall see how the solution to this inner 
affective problem, a solution which may amount to a despairing renunciation 
of any attempt at a solution, is something that colors all the rest of 
philosophy. Underlying even the so-called problem of knowledge there is 
nothing more than this human feeling, just as underlying the inquiry into the 
why, into the cause, there is simply the search for the wherefore, for the end 
purpose. All the rest is either self-deception or a wish to deceive others by 
way of deceiving one’s self. And this personal and affective point of 
departure for all philosophy and all religion is the tragic sense of life.
56
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Unamuno begins Tragic Sense of Life by reworking Terence’s assertion, “I am a man; 
nothing human do I deem foreign” into, “I am a man, no other man do I deem a stranger.”57 
One cannot go more quickly to the core of Unamuno’s thought than to understand his 
insistence that nihil humani, properly understood, ought to read: nullum hominem, for there is 
no “mankind”, there are only human beings. He took great attention to the debt he owed 
historical circumstances that gave rise to his works and emphasized them at every 
opportunity. So when he speaks of the great influences to his thought, he regards them not by 
their ‘systems’ of thought but by their relation to the larger picture of common human life—
thus “the man Socrates”, “the man Kant”, “the man William James”, “the tragic Jew from 
Amsterdam [Spinoza]”.  
 
Each philosopher—each man—stood, as we all do, as the middle term in the dialectical 
interplay between mortality and immortality. As such, Unamuno’s own personality intersects 
with the desires and journeys of meaning of these other human beings; but, rather than taking 
for granted the supremacy of reason in human thought, understands its great complexity. 
Reason is an indispensable tool for coping with the world and at the same time, at its worst, it 
is the enemy of life. “The man of flesh and bone” is the one who dares to go on a journey of 
individuation or meaning lives in congoja (anguish), in the depths of the abyss. Various 
responses are possible—ignore conflict, to despair altogether, or to resign himself and endure 
it.  
 
    To be sure, a typical Christian response, particularly in the Protestant tradition which 
Unamuno venerated, is to endure, but Unamuno seems to ask how shall we endure? He 
ultimately suggests an active resignation which will not only embrace inward struggle as the 
essence of personhood but will recognize the same anguish in the lives of other people. 
“Human beings aflame with a burning charity towards their neighbours are thus enkindled 
because they have touched the depth of their own misery, their own apparentiality, their own 
nothingness, and then, turning their newly opened eyes upon their fellows, they have seen 
that they are also miserable, apparential, condemned to nothingness, and they have pitied 
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them and loved them.”58 This active resignation becomes manifest later, in Saint Manuel, the 
Good Martyr. 
 
Those who seek the answer to immortality through dogmatic Christianity alone are 
confronted with the dilemma that faith must be rationalized and when rationalized, becomes 
dogma. Immortality is a hunger for security that is perpetually attacked by ones doubts.
59
 
Unamuno notes the presence of the sense of the conflictual elements in Christian thought as 
much as he does those aspects of Christianity which venerate more dearly a linear conception 
of history. For Unamuno, the attempt to ‘prove’ the existence of God suggests a ‘system’ of 
belief which is in the end very limiting and not at all suggestive of a “guarantor of full 
ontological security”.60  
 
When Unamuno places God qualitatively beyond the limitations and errors of doctrine, he 
not only suggests that what matters is ones attitude toward God, but also that the ‘idea’ of 
God cannot be contained in any one system. Unamuno, then, suggests that theology in the 
classical sense is a basic contradiction in itself since there can be no compatibility between 
theos and logia. The being of God is not in question; it is the human capacity for self 
individuation and awareness which is in question. The search, then, is not for the answer to 
an abstract question but for the experience of relationship and religious experience which can 
transform doubt into a “creative condition” in which the human life is affirmed. As ones 
devotion to God lifts them above interpretation, they escape the traps of fanaticism and 
supremacy and learn, in Unamuno’s words, to “live off the struggle”; to live an authentic 
existence comes in assuming the reality of contradiction in existence.
61
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Abel Sanchez 
The struggle over the human reaction to existential contradiction feeds directly into 
Unamuno’s “passion” novel, Abel Sanchez. This complex commentary on the pride and envy 
inherent in Spanish life, as well as Unamuno’s own, continues the fashion of intra-historia, 
and develops further as he did with a previous novel, Mist, the concept of the nivola. The 
priorities of the classic novel in Unamuno’s perspective do not speak to the complex nature 
of personality; he does not think of personality as something which can be reduced to a set of 
qualities. His critique of the realist novels of 19
th
 century Spain was that it was lacking in the 
true, eternal reality, the reality of personality”62. Realism for Unamuno could become more 
real when the inner conflicts of the personal reality are emphasized in art. The stressed placed 
on human personality in relationship and an awareness of human limitations are the essence 
of the nivola. The concept of nivola not only envisions a departure from the depth-lacking 
realism of Spanish Krausianism, but also the primacy of multiple dialogue, rather than 
description.
63
  
 
The novel itself is about two persons, connected to each other almost at the hip, yet 
representing different systems of thought: Joaquin Monegro, the rationalist who becomes a 
scientist, and Abel Sanchez, an intuitive who becomes an artist. As they quarrel early in the 
novel (Chapter I) about the nature and merit of their respective professions, it is evident that 
Abel is the more clever and popular of the two. Later (Chapter XI), when the quarells become 
more intense and the sense of division is imminent, Joaquin calls Abel a “scientific painter”, 
whilst Abel retorts that Joaquin is an “artistic doctor”. Abel further points out that putting 
names to paintings is too “literary”, for art should be able speak for itself. Here Unamuno 
returns to the paradoxes which intra history seeks to navigate; namely, the conflicts between 
science and art. 
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It is a mutual affection for Helena, Joaquin’s cousin, which signals the beginning of the 
end of their relationship. Helena, indifferent to Joaquin, eventually marries Abel and they 
have a son together. Eventually, Joaquin too marries Antonia, described as a devout gentle 
girl who sympathises with his melancholy. However, it is jealousy and envy, the desire for 
what is Abel’s, which broods in Joaquin’s psyche. Even the birth of his daughter is not 
enough to cultivate a sense of peace within. 
 
    When Abel, who is preparing a painting of the story of Cain, lends him Byron’s Cain, 
Joaquin identifies strongly with him, and begins to wonder if his own soul is identical with 
his hatred of Abel. When he read of Lucifer declaring to Cain that he was immortal, he began 
to think with terror that if he were immortal himself then the hate within him must also be 
immortal. Since he would have a soul, his soul would be possessed of hate. He concluded that 
it could not be otherwise, since hate could not be a function of his body. A corruptible 
organism could not hate as he did. Lucifer aspired to be God, and since his childhood, 
Joaquin had aspired to displace others. Yes, hate would be immortal in the soul of the one 
possessed by it.
64
  
 
 
    Joaquin tries to suppress his envy by using what he has: his power of rationality. He sucks 
up his pride enough to make a speech at a dinner in Abel’s honour; later he embarks on a 
return to religion. None of these are sufficient to frustrate his inner destructiveness. When 
Joaquin asks Father Echeverria why he was born, the priest replies that the right question is 
rather “for what” are we born. That is to reiterate an essential aspect to Unamuno’s thought, 
that reason alone will never answer the question of why, and that life must be directed 
towards some ultimate aim. Joaquin simply cannot believe in a God of redemption; he is 
more fixated on blaming God for his own tragic existence. He gives up on freewill, and in a 
succession of events comes to discover—or rather rationalize—that envy is universal.65 
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    Ultimately, the text shows how Joaquin’s painful emotions of envy, jealousy and hate 
towards Abel render his existence and sense of self completely dependent on Abel’s life and 
success.
66
 The two men’s children grow up, and in a twist of circumstances, Abelin (Abel’s 
son) and Joaquin’s daughter, Joaquina, eventually marry as a consequence of Abelin’s 
decision to become a doctor like Joaquin and because of his distant father. So Joaquin 
becomes a new father figure for him, to both Abelin and Joaquin’s pleasure. Again Unamuno 
is keen to show the desire for individuation and security through these characters. 
 
    The marriage brings Joaquin a temporary relief; until the moment that Abel comes to see 
him before the marriage. Joaquin begins to set down a ‘Confession’, a record of his passion 
and of his general sense of human depravity. It can be seen as Joaquin’s attempt to impose his 
personal interpretation of his life upon all the other interpretations, and illustrates another 
concern of Unamuno, the relationship between narrative and history, between fiction and life. 
The Confession reveals the many selves of Joaquin: the husband, the father, the doctor, the 
orator, the writer and he has other selves in the eyes of others, from Antonia’s “a man who 
suffers”67 to Helena’s description of Joachim as “unbearable”68 together with other adjectives 
such as “envious”, 69  “good, honourable” 70  or a “soul on fire” 71 . Other definitions are 
contained within Joaquin’s perceptions of others’ perceptions. No one definition fully defines 
him, though the relationships between these various definitions may go some way to defining 
the complexity that is the self. In the end, however, the self is ultimately elusive. This being 
so, one cannot expect to encounter in the narrative traditional forms of characterization, just 
as we cannot expect other determinants of character which fiction usually employs. 
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    Towards the end of the Abel Sanchez, another degree of separation is introduced with the 
birth of Joaquin—and Abel’s—grandchild. When reading Byron’s Cain, Joaquin had found 
the suggestion that if Abel had left children, their marriage to Cain’s children might have 
alleviated the hatred Cain bore in his soul. With his grandchild, Joaquinto, Joaquin envisions 
one more opportunity to be proved that there is a sense of justice and perpetuity for him. He 
desperately asks, “Who has he taken after…who does he look like…whose blood runs in his 
veins?”—a question which would be asked with vigour by a member of the Spanish 
traditionalists.   
 
    However, the grandchild in time moves toward Abel, the painter. In despair of this final act 
of, say, cosmic rejection, Joaquin confronts an already ailing Abel one last time to beg him to 
release his hold on the child, and in a scene of anger Abel shouts that the child rejects Joaquin 
because Abel is “poisoning him” with deceit. When he refuses to let the boy go, Joaquin 
rushes at him, grabs him by the throat, and because of Abel’s already frail health, suffers 
angina attack and dies. One can immediately assume that it was Joaquin who murdered Abel, 
but the history of heart problems, and the ultimate confession from Joaquin that “He was 
killing me for more than forty years…with his happiness and his triumphs.72” A year later on 
his own deathbed, Joaquin wishes for total oblivion, to be wiped from the memory of both the 
family and, ultimately, God. Antonia, who is committed to Joaquin’s consumed suffering73 to 
the end, is dealt perhaps the most tragic blow emotionally, when Joaquin confesses that he 
didn’t love her this entire time, and that the choice to do so, in retrospect, would have saved 
him. “I could have loved you and that would have been my salvation, but I didn’t love you.” 
 
The role in which confession as the foundation of this nivola framework plays is 
particularly important for at least three reasons. First is the obvious interplay with Catholic 
tradition, the role it has in traditionally Catholic nations like Spain, and Unamuno’s 
methodical aim of making religious and secular language heard in concert with each other. 
Second, for the sense of and need for honesty which Unamuno employs in his philosophical 
writings. The argument might be that one does more harm suppressing one’s feelings than 
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giving reign to them.
74
 Joaquin is obsessed with his own paradox of desiring to be 
remembered through his work, his Confession and particularly his Memoirs. Yet during the 
course of the nivola, when someone confronts Joaquin with his personality, his response is to 
silence them—a way of keeping the appearances of peace when there is none. Another theme 
is built upon the theme of immortality and how one’s identity is recalled by others. As 
Macklin sums the work up, “the pain of the branded protagonist is so strong, his self-
condemnation so pitiful that, for all its awkwardness, its bombast, and its lamentations, Abel 
Sanchez is a curiously moving confession of a man bound to his own rack, and its nakedness 
may be accepted as the proper counterpart of the rawness of Joaquin’s wounds.”75 
 
The Agony of Christianity  
    Tragic Sense of Life and Abel Sanchez represent Unamuno’s wrestling with the complexity 
of personality as they encroach themselves within a holistic existential framework. As we 
have seen, religion in Unamuno’s perspective is not divorced from issues of being. Although 
Unamuno first realizes the hypocrisy in theology, in The Agony of Christianity (1924) and his 
last nivola, Saint Manuel the Good, Martyr (1930), he seeks to develop something of a 
theology beyond traditional religion. Unamuno believed that the "agony" of modern 
Christianity was as unalterably personal as it was universal, for throughout Europe he found 
the same spiritual hunger, a hunger, he declares, that often turned into an "anti-Christian 
fury".  
 
 
The historical seeds of La agonia lie in his essay “Pascalian Faith” written in the beginning of 
his first exile in 1923, and which ultimately becomes Chapter nine of la agonia.  Unamuno 
attacks the “pedagogical industry” of the anti-mystical Jesuit education which dominated 
Reformation-era Spain and France. The existence of God and its proof was central to this 
education. The mathematician Pascal, in his fights with the Vatican Council, drew the 
contrast between pure religiosity and the casuistry of Jesuit pedagogy, thereby killing the 
agonic life of Christianity. Yet, Pascal’s paradox is that without the accommodations of 
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Jesuitical casuistry, a moral secular life could not be sustained.
76
  So for Pascal struggle was a 
necessary part of religious experience. Unamuno points out Pascal’s call to abdicate 
(abêtissement) reason. This abdication is ultimately a personal task, for one can commit the 
suicide of reason only for oneself, never for others, though this is certainly what the Jesuits 
try to do. 
 
 
    In the story of Pascal’s struggle with Religious pedagogy, Unamuno saw the conflict 
within Christian faith between material and spiritual values where orthodoxy saw the triumph 
of Christianity over the flesh, the material, and the social. He saw the misfortune of 
Christianity in terms of its conflict between the opposing idea of immortality and eschatology 
in its Jewish roots and its Hellenic social thought. Two irreconcilable differences—the 
Judaic, Pharisaic, psychic hope of resurrection of the flesh and the Platonic idea of 
immortality of the soul.
77
 As a State-sanctioned tradition linked with an idea of the self in 
society,
78
 can the idea of immortality serve both spiritual and material ends?  
 
 
    Unamuno saw the Jewish idea of immortality as a social condition to be more 
understanding of the cultural finalities of human experience than the Hellenist-centred 
Christian formalism, “which emphasised God over the history-bound individual”79. Whilst he 
appreciates the ‘angst’ of Judaism over the formalism of orthodox and evangelical 
Christianity, he also appreciates the angst out of which was born the first century Church. As 
a Jew, Unamuno suggests that Jesus may have believed in the resurrection of the flesh rather 
than Platonic immortality. But in the Passion and Resurrection of Christ, the agony of 
Christianity was born: The struggle between the Jewish and Platonic visions of eternal life
80
.  
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    The lack of a sense of agony and wrestling with contradiction in Spanish Catholicism is 
only a microcosm of the widespread problem with Christianity itself, a faith which no longer 
struggles and agonises but dies in her own ignorance. The value of the Church is that she 
unifies belief for the communicative and collective effect of Faith which, if left unhandled, 
may encase each person in himself, with Faith being the projection of their own compulsions 
and desires. However, the Church too bound by dogma, much like the Catholicism of the 
Reformation era, reduces absolutes to the sphere of relative knowledge and blurs the 
incommensurability of the eternal. “Evangelical Christianity”, Unamuno surmised, seeks 
eternal life outside of History, whereas the Fundamentals of Judaism oriented its ideals 
around the fate of the society and for the living of life. So a Christianity born not out of State 
affirmation or a sense of abstract notion of eternity but rather in the tension between the 
incommunicable knowledge of God and collective truth should not be dissolved, because “so 
long as struggle prevails in life there is life, and death is fended off”. It is not “struggle for 
life”—survival—but struggle as the very image of life itself81.  
 
 
    The Agony of Christianity is an important document of Unamuno’s approach toward 
‘theology’ in that it positions his ‘existentialism’ in the light of social values, or more 
importantly, the re-evaluation of social values. There are interpreters of Unamuo, such as 
Paul Ilie, who think that Unamuno suggests the absurdity of ‘social Christianity’, that when it 
comes to Faith in its social manifestation, he is more akin to Nietszche in that his quest for 
immortality manifested in material life is the development of what Ilie calls an “evolutionary 
utopianism”.82  
 
Saint Manuel the Good, Martyr 
 
    The isolation of Unamuno’s exile years, and the disappointment with the pro-traditionalist 
(and church-sponsored) dictatorship of Miguel Primo de Rivera leads him, after the radical 
spiritual vision of Agony, to take the webs of fatality in his thought further to a resigned 
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activism in his last novel Saint Manuel the Good, Martyr (1930)
83
. Inspired by the legends in 
Valverde de Lucerna (his place of exile and the town in the novel) of a mythical predecessor 
village in which Christ returned as a beggar and destroyed it because he was refused alms,
84
 
Unamuno creates a parable of a very human Christ figure
85
 in the guise of what essentially 
was representative of his most virulent detractors during Rivera’s regime: a Catholic priest. 
Unamuno’s ‘enemies’ would ironically have him, and Saint Manuel, as a source of support in 
the disastrous years of the Republic.   
 
 
Don Manuel is being remembered by Angela—who at her death passes her story to 
Unamuno—and her brother Lazaro (Lazarus), in preparation for Manuel’s canonisation as a 
saint. Angela remembers her priest as “helper, conscience, lay confessor and ‘mother’”86. For 
Lazaro, Manuel is the one who turned him from absolute rationalism to faith. However—and 
Unamuno reveals again the motif of tragic silence on which we commented in Abel 
Sanchez—Don Manuel had lost his personal belief in immortality—thought it seems not of 
God
87—long ago. Yet he never publicly exposes his community to his lost belief; indeed; he 
never preaches a ‘tragic’ Gospel heterodox to faith. In the fashion of Christ, who remains 
faithful to his religion whilst at the same time giving new vision to faith, Don Manuel’s own 
sense of mission comes not in the conventional social construct where faith and order are 
fixed narratives and the rule is not to disturb them. It is rather in the ‘intrahistorical’ pastoral 
relationships Manuel makes with people like Angela, in whom Manuel’s influence costs her a 
job as a teacher early in life. Yet in Manuel, Angela sees the second of “two Christs—the one 
of this earth and the one of this village”88.  
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    For Angela, Manuel’s secret agony of faith is a surprise to her, as Lazaro’s own connection 
with him has revealed. At first Lazaro accuses Manuel of hypocrisy; after the death of his and 
Angela’s mother, however, he begins to go to Mass and begins taking Communion. Manuel 
saw his task was to let his congregation “dream that they are immortal, and not to kill them”. 
This is what he encouraged Lazaro to do for, as he told him, “Truth may be something 
terrible, something unbearable and deadly. Simple people could not live on with it. There is 
no one true religion; any religion is true in so far as it allows its adhearents to live spiritually 
and consoles them for being born in order to die”. This type of ‘simplicity’ is most 
characterised not by the congregation, but by the local layabouts; Blasillo, who is able to 
accept the fundamentals of classic Christianity without question (“la fe del carbonero”)89. It is 
this “el bobo” who is Manuel’s alter ego, or ahistorical self, as Jurkevich notes, because 
Blasillo reinforces Manuel’s desire, however unrealised, to “stultify reason in faith”90, or to 
become bound to the foolishness of faith.  
 
 
    Lazaro’s interaction with Manuel, however, reveals that he had to resist a longing to drown 
himself in the town lake, thereby liberating himself from the lie by submerging himself in the 
“lake of mystery” which reflects the “mountain of eternity”91. Manuel reveals throughout the 
novel the importance of maintaining the “dream” of the afterlife, to “make them dream they 
are immortal”, even while Manuel himself has rejected the idea; or rather, traded a theology 
meditating on the afterlife for meditating on death and suffering. It is this focus of going 
against the grain of what is expected by a priest that he is able to make “victims” of the 
people in the town and abroad of this “stupendous deception” called immortality. 92 
Ultimately Manuel finds his “cross” in distributing to his people “the dream” of faith, 
consoling himself as he consoles the people
93. Manuel’s final words to Lazaro and Angela, 
who take Don Manuel to the church for one last sermon as he dies: “Listen: take care of these 
poor sheep, that they are consoled with life, that they believe what I have not been able to 
believe. And you Lazaro, when you are about to die, die like me, as our Angela will die, in 
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the bosom of the Holy Mother Catholic Apostolic Roman church, of the Holy Mother Church 
of Valverde de Lucerna of course. And until never seeing more, since this dream of life 
ends...”94 
 
 
    Upon Lazaro’s own death, Angela is left to wonder whether these two “holy men” as she 
describes, had died in the conviction that they had not truly believed, and yet they had 
believed. Don Manuel had converted Lazaro to learn to live through the reality and struggle 
with death. Angela’s own conversion through the piety of this so-called nonbelieving priest 
reveals the depth and truth of his faith. What matters most to Unamuno, it seems, is the 
“dream-meaning of life” a common theme he shares with the Generation of 1898: that “from 
memory only the gift of evoking dreams is valid”.95  Manuel is a final manifestation of the 
interchangeability of faith, life, doubt and death; much like the flow of the sea, the acts of 
reconstitution and resurrection involved in the dynamics of hope serve to reconstruct rather 
than destroy tradition.  
 
 
    As Unamuno states at the end of Saint Manuel
96, this novel is essentially about ‘nothing’; 
nothing more than the flow of life between belief and doubt, between active participation in 
life and the need for silence, and the need to express the agony which binds the pieces 
together. Unamuno’s construction of the sense of the tragic in Saint Manuel is a mimic of 
Don Quixote’s spiritual quest and external sense of commitment, but it is also a supplement 
and extension to his philosophical investigation of the meaning of faith. At once it is pseudo-
autobiographical; at the same time it is a final statement on a major theme in Unamuno’s 
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sense of tragedy: the ambiguity of what death means over and against the meaning of 
immortality, or “survival”.97  
 
 
The Problem of Personality 
 
The generation which read Saint Manuel—once and for all embittered by the intrusion of the 
Church in political life—read the novel as if it were a final indictment on religion in society, 
“an indictment not against the tortured priest who embodied a lie out of love for the people, 
but against the many others who tried to keep the Spanish villages submerged in dark 
ignorance because it guaranteed the power of their organisation.”98 In spite of his major 
works on philosophy and Christianity as well as Saint Manuel being banned as reading in the 
Roman Catholic Church
99
, Unamuno uses as a point of departure for all of his works a pursuit 
of what are to him principles which are definitively Christian: Immortality, the resurrection, 
and the personality of God. 
 
 
    In making these principles particularly Christian points of departure, Unamuno seeks a 
remedy for the “original sin” of assumed Christianity—that is, the presence and power of 
orthodox Christianity without an investigation through experience of its validity or social 
relevance. Blanco-Aguinaga calls it the condemnation of the Idea to time, “existence without 
self- consciousness”.100 But the central characters in most of Unamuno’s fiction move from 
this ‘condemnation’ to the deeper conflict; the problem of human continuity in light of 
survival. “What poisoned them all”, he recalls the characters in the prologue to Saint Manuel, 
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“was the awesome problem of personality, if one is, and will continue to be, what one is.”101  
A true exploration of specifically Christian principles is for him liberation from an enforced, 
uncreative faith. That liberation, however, moves one to encounter the heretofore un-
embraced spirit. This “exquisite pain”102 is what sets one free. 
 
    Lacy suggests that Unamuno’s paradoxical and ambiguous aesthetic language—the pursuit 
to create wonder in faith in the midst of the obsolescence of orthodoxy—shares synergies 
with the theological development of Dietrich Bonhoeffer. In speaking of the conflict in which 
traditional dogmatic categories have created a preserved dissonance between the Church and 
society, Bonhoeffer comes to a conclusion—ambiguous in itself—which echoes of Don 
Manuel: 
 
    “In the traditional rite and ceremonies we are groping after 
something new and revolutionary without being able to understand it 
or utter it yet. That is our own fault. During these years the Church 
has fought for self-preservation as though it were an end in itself, 
and has thereby lost its chance to speak a word of reconciliation to 
mankind and to the world at large. So our traditional language must 
perforce remain powerless and remain silent, and our Christianity 
today will be confined to praying for and doing right by our fellow 
men.” 103 
 
Conclusion 
 
    The aesthetic religious philosophy of Unamuno is characterised by an active resignation to 
the quest for spiritual authenticity. The elements of tragedy, death, envy, and doubt in 
Unamuno’s exploration of identity, faith, and immortality bring him to the conclusion that to 
be authentically human means facing the “disease” of consciousness and avoiding the evasion 
of mortality. God is the premise—the working hypothesis—from which the human 
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contradictions of faith and doubt collide. For Unamuno, Christianity is never based upon the 
presumptions of ‘tradition’, but based upon the extent that Christianity can speak and act for 
the interests of “the man of flesh and bone”. The density of Unamuno’s theological thought 
comes from the perspective of an artist whose concern with faith as the centre of his nations’ 
future and the world. Yet, he does not permit one to follow a fixed idea of theology’s relation 
to culture. As Barea notes, “His search, not his results, was supremely important to 
him…Those problems were his own, but he conceived them also as problems of other 
Spaniards, of his country as a whole, and of humanity…by following his monologue, or 
rather his interior duologue turned into written words”.104 
 
    Bonhoeffer, as we have briefly examined, shares similarities with Unamuno in the 
readjustment of the language of faith. In the next chapter we want to examine the 
development of his aesthetic language, largely inspired by music, and the implications for the 
‘tragic’ sentiment within what he calls a “worldly Christianity”.  
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CHAPTER TWO 
Bonhoeffer’s Theological “Angst” 
 
..nothing tortures us more than longing…Substitutes repel us… We have to 
suffer unspeakably from the separation, and feel the longing till it makes us ill. 
That is the only way, although it is a painful one, in which we can preserve 
unimpaired our relationship with our loved ones…There is nothing worse in 
such times than to try to find a substitute for the irreplaceable.
1
 
 
 
    Dietrich Bonhoeffer’s theological angst is at once a plea for those values of genuine 
Christian community which are “irreplaceable” and which, not simply survive in a Nazi 
prison, but in a “world come of age” as he famously retorts. His angst is also is an important 
instrument in understanding how his well-informed interest of aesthetics shapes his journey 
toward discovering the roots of authentic Christian community. John de Gruchy notes that 
Bonhoeffer’s innumerable references to music in his letters whilst in prison are evidence to 
the extent music and aesthetic inquiry played in this theological reflection.
2
 His theological 
development early on, as well, is informed by his concern for culture. Trained as a classical 
pianist, Bonhoeffer’s early period was focused on developing a critical approach to theology 
and philosophical enquiry and, thus concerned about the aesthetic elements of Church 
community. Bonhoeffer’s aesthetic concern for depth and reality in the representation and 
interpretation of the Christian faith is an important foundation in understanding the nature of 
Bonhoeffer’s theology as a whole. 
 
 
    In his later work his comments on the relation of art to faith and society become distinctive 
points of departure for his critique of the Church and his conception of the future of the 
Church. A theology increasingly reinforced by musical metaphor relate to the ‘fragmentary’ 
atmosphere of Bonhoeffer’s Christianity in a “world come of age”. Bonhoeffer’s bourgeois 
upbringing collide with a fixation on death, anxiety, and the role of the prophetic impulse in 
Christianity. Robin Lovin notes that, more than his Reformed contemporaries, Bonhoeffer 
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saw himself theologically and culturally as a child of Inter-war Europe and Weimar 
Germany, so it was natural for him to see these events as part of the shaping of his life rather 
than an invasion of the order of life as it may have seemed to Barth or Brunner.
3
  
 
     
    As Bonhoeffer develops a way toward a ‘worldly’ Christianity, he envisions the artistic 
elements culture and Divine revelation equally liberated from the strictures of the order of 
society. German Christianity suffered from bourgeois pietism and ultimately a reactionary 
dogmatism detached from the connections between power, action, and creativity. Christine 
Schleisser has recently discovered the inconsistencies and ambiguity of Bonhoeffer’s 
conception of guilt and the influence of the idea of the tragic.
4
 In Ethics he identifies the 
essence of Greek Tragedy as bound within a “clash of incompatible laws… by which humans 
are destroyed”.5  This incompatibility is a thread which runs throughout his early and later 
work, born out of his own attempt (as with Unamuno) to develop an alternative to dualism. 
Yet, in Ethics it seems that he becomes torn between the contradictory nature of tragedy and 
the possibilities of an “untragic unity” as inspired by Luther’s doctrine of ‘Two Kingdoms’.6 
This is a struggle Bonhoeffer tries to overcome by emphasising the relevance of 
reconciliation and the unity of God with the world.
7
   
 
 
    I seek in this chapter to consider Bonhoeffer’s aesthetic reflection—with respect to visual 
art, literature and especially music— and the extent to which it tempers his theological and 
practical expression. I shall explore how a lucid theological landscape and a vision of for an 
aesthetically imagined ecclesiology is rooted in a theology of ‘the person’. As he comes to 
consider the idea of the tragic in view of suffering and guilt, Bonhoeffer’s aesthetically 
expressed theology is complicated. I see similarities between Bonhoeffer and Unamuno 
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which may be able to link him with a ‘tragic’ theology and help us further develop our 
thoughts on the theme.   
 
The Barriers of the Personal 
 
    Although figures such as Karl Barth factor as an academic influence on Bonhoeffer almost 
in a sole capacity, it is the burgeoning Personalist interpretations of Christianity in the early 
20
th
 Century which anchors his revolt against a dualist universe. Sanctorum Communio 
suggests the substantial relationship to consciousness and community. He insists that the 
‘spirit’ of a social structure (i.e. family, university, and nation) is a sui generis reality. 
Individuals do not act without affecting one another. Interactions between people, then, begin 
to take shape based on the character and behaviours of each.  
 
It is our view that there would be no self-consciousness without community 
– or better, that self-consciousness arises concurrently with the 
consciousness of existing in community. Second, we assert that will is by its 
nature oriented toward other wills…God does not desire a history of 
individual human beings, but the history of the human community. 
However, God does not want a community that absorbs the individual into 
itself, but a community of human beings. In God’s eyes, community and 
individual exist in the same moment and rest in one another.
8
  
 
    This sense of being and becoming, I and Thou rationality, is crucial to what Paul M. 
Harrison calls the “dramaturgical” effect of religion: the trans-personal play between the 
public and “primal” selves.9   
 
 
    Bonhoeffer critiques the thought of his teacher Max Scheler, whose philosophy of value, to 
him, is in danger of taking away the value of human beings “as God’s creatures” and thus 
acknowledging them as a ‘means’ to an end. Double autonomy between the individual person 
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and the communal, where the ‘saint’ has the highest ethical standing in the community. As 
the Christian ‘person’ originates in the medium between God and humanity, any idea of 
ultimate value, “even when it regards the value of the person as highest value, is in danger of 
taking away the value of persons as such, as God’s creatures, and acknowledging them only 
insofar as the person is the ‘bearer’ of objective, impersonal value.”10  This very idea feeds 
into Scheler’s idea that values such as ‘beauty’, ‘the good’, and ‘the holy’ possess a unifying 
power: 
 
…What does Scheler mean by ‘unifying’? Evidently he means the possibility 
of gathering several people around one object at a time…To say that the ‘realm 
of the spirit, or the ‘holy’, would by nature be more likely than the sensory 
sphere to provide such a possibility is correct, but devoid of content…The flaw 
in Scheler’s argument lies in the fact that in the idea of the holy [or of the 
beautiful or the true] is that he proceeds from a metaphysical notion of value 
that in its absoluteness remains inaccessible to us.
11
 
 
    Scheler’s personalist idealism presents for Bonhoeffer a “static” picture of humanity where 
one knows what they ought to do, and with precision.  “Where is there room”, says 
Bonhoeffer, “for distress of conscience, for infinite anxiety in the face of decisions?”12   One 
enters the realm of the social, says Bonhoeffer, the moment the intellect of the “I” is 
confronted with a “fundamental barrier”. To conceive the barrier is to go beyond it, finding 
The Other as one who becomes the catalyst for ethical meaning and decision. “…the 
metaphysical concept of the individual is defined without mediation, whereas the ethical 
concept of the person is a definition based on ethical-social interaction.”13  
 
 
    Unity is not the same thing as community or individuality for Bonhoeffer, and he felt that 
the Christian idea of equality should be understood from a broader perspective; not simply as 
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a binding through “affinity of souls”, but through the very real “dissimilarities” between 
individuals. Conflict of wills is the nature of communication in community
14
; Personality is 
found within the noticeable boundaries.
15
 
 
It is quite possible, and even necessary, to acknowledge that, from a 
Christian perspective, there are some who are strong and others who are 
weak, some who are honourable and others who are dishonourable, some 
who are from an ethical and religious perspective, exemplary and others who 
are inferior; and then, of course, there are obvious social dissimilarities. But 
this insight can exist only within the confines of the very idea of equality 
before God that is beyond our perception. This equality must now also be 
realised within the framework of what is possible in principle, in that 
strength and weakness, honour and disgrace, morality and immorality, piety 
and impiety exist together and not just in isolation.
16
  
 
    Bonhoeffer’s favour of the essence of true spiritual relationship against an idealist 
relationship is crucial for our discussion on the tragic for several reasons. Bonhoeffer’s 
pursuit in SC to bring ‘light’ and ‘dark’ into an understanding of the Church community 
corresponds to Unamuno’s understanding of consciousness as ‘participated knowledge’; this 
relationship of human beings to each other and to the world is, in itself, the tragic sense of 
existence in a detached world. On the rejection of an idealist idea of community Unamuno 
and Bonhoeffer would be in agreement, vying instead for a Christian community in which the 
‘primal unity’ of the world is reflected and embodied. Ultimately this is crucial for 
understanding how his reflections between the ‘ominous’ and the ‘fanciful’ in musical 
styles—both in the Church and in music—serve to develop a more personalist interpretation 
of music in the Christian experience.    
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Beyond Bourgeois sensibilities 
 
    Bonhoeffer’s initial interest in theology was less motivated by the ethical consequences of 
discipleship as it was on an “existential concern to meet the scepticism of the ‘cultured 
despisers of Christianity’.”17  Theology was initially a course of exploring epistemological 
issues than a moral conviction for Bonhoeffer; however his bourgeois upbringing (namely his 
devout mother
18
) developed in him the Lutheran emphasis on music as second priority to 
theology, even in music’s poetic ‘hiddenness’ in theology. 19   Here Bonhoeffer suggests 
Luther’s assertion that “spiritual things” gather into the diversity of community.20 As a result, 
his writings also reveal an understanding that the crisis of art is intertwined with the crisis of 
religion.  
 
 
   As an example of Bonhoeffer’s disagreement with Scheler’s disconnect between value and 
reality, one notices in Sanctorum Communio
21
  his early criticisms of neo-classicism which 
essentially defined the 19
th
 century Europe and was manifested in the work of sculptor Bertel 
Thorwaldsen (1770 – 1844) and the composer Felix Mendelssohn (1809 – 1847), who, whilst 
a composer of Jewish heritage, gained popularity through a revival of the Baroque tradition 
and, in a sense provided the ‘soundtrack’ to Romantic European life and art. These to 
Bonhoeffer are indicative of the cultivation of ‘bourgeois’ value in a Christianity which 
serves a multiplicity of personalities: 
 
One simply has to take a look at the pictures hanging in Christian 
education facilities and church fellowship halls, or think about the 
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architecture of churches of recent decades or the church music of 
Mendelssohn and others—it seems to me to betray a complete ignorance 
about the essentially social nature of the church. It would be an 
interesting task for a sociology of the church to undertake a historical 
examination of what the church produced in the artistic field.
22
 
 
    The goal of such an examination in Bonhoeffer’s view is with the goal of bringing “the 
proletariate” into the church, thus ensuring this diversity and tension which cultivates ‘The 
Holy’ in Christian community. 23  The artistic expressions of the church in a church-
community defined by diversity rather than bourgeois sensibilities will not be best expressed 
by “Thorwaldsen and Mendelssohn”…but rather Dürer, Rembrandt, and Bach”. In 
Bonhoeffer’s assessment of the relation to aesthetics to Christian thought, it is interesting to 
note his affinity for darker works which present, for him, an expression of ‘inner beauty’ as 
well as ‘outer beauty’. Although he understands full well that the latter artists as being of 
bourgeois heritage,
24
 he emphasises them for a certain quality of ‘dark’ and light’ which is 
most representative in their work, and represents more honestly the times in which they lived.  
 
 
    It has been widely asserted in recent scholarship that Bonhoeffer’s first encounter with 
American culture during his time at Union Theological Seminary in 1930-31, and with the 
African American church particularly, is a significant bridge for the development of the 
cosmopolitan impetus which came to ground his theology.
25
 It was not necessarily in this 
context only that Bonhoeffer “discovered a theology by way of aesthetics26”. It is more 
accurate to say that his immersion in the African American religious experience and 
American liberal theology ‘liberated’ him to make connections between what he gained from 
bourgeois German culture—a love of music and the ability to ‘think’ reasonably about the 
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process and product of music and art in particular, but also an understanding of the role 
cultural inclusivity has in the development of society.
27
  
 
 
    As for Union Theological Seminary, from his letters he seems to have been wary of the 
pragmatism he found there,
28
 and even more unimpressed by systematic theologians and the 
“frivolous” state of preaching in Euro-American churches. In Reinhold Niebuhr’s course 
“Ethical Viewpoints in Modern Literature” he was introduced to African American thinkers 
like WEB DuBois, James Weldon Johnson and the thinkers of the Harlem Renaissance
29
, an 
artistic and philosophical movement which has its roots in a conception of ‘African 
American” personalism. In his notes for the course he seems to have appreciated Johnson’s 
thoughts on the relation to oppression and laughter, quoting him that “the salvation of the 
American Negro is the laughter”.30 Bonhoeffer’s observation can be paralleled with Mary 
Ellison’s account of the development of slave songs as a subversive artistic expression: 
“Acceptance of oppression was never a state of mind that the majority of slaves subscribed 
to. Even during those constraining years of slavery, black people retained their sense of 
independence and individuality, and refused to be mere property.” 31  It is in this act of 
rebellious inner “refusal” that the comic and the tragic of African American experience 
converge. On the whole Bonhoeffer engages the conflict within African American literature 
of the double-consciousness of being human—a being with thoughts, feelings and a desire to 
be recognised in the wider community community— and ‘black’—being part of a 
“suppressed and offended race.”32 
 
 
    It is obvious that Bonhoeffer’s engagement with African American culture was not simply 
cursory, but it served as a space where he could engage honestly with “the climate of human 
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relations”33 in America as well as the relation of culture to word.  Whilst he could find no 
great cloud of witnesses within the Euro American Christian community,
34
 in spaces like the 
Abyssinian Baptist Church, where he taught bible study, he received an introduction to the 
Social Gospel both within the ‘liberal’ American theological context and the marginalised 
African American context.
35
 Through the sermons of Adam Clayton Powell, Sr., Bonhoeffer 
acquired a language which would best suit what he would later call ‘worldly Christianity.”36 
Powell's culturally engaged sermons blended the artful rhetoric and congregational, non-
creedal style of the black Baptist church with the best of American social pragmatism.  
 
 
    Not only did Bonhoeffer experience the ‘poetry’ and sense of suffering inherent in African 
American music and proclamation, but he was also able to preach at least once within this 
climate. As a reminiscence by Rudolf Schade explains: 
 
One Monday morning Bonhoeffer called him out of the library so that “he 
could share the previous day’s experience with him…Bonhoeffer conveyed 
the thrill and joy of having had members of the congregation respond to his 
message. They expressed their support and agreement with his points by 
punctuating his sermon with ‘Amens’ and ‘Hallelujahs.’37 
 
     It is inconceivable to think that Bonhoeffer’s encounters with the African American 
religious community ended within the walls of the church. The area surrounding Abyssinian 
Baptist Church was a window into the cultural and spiritual experience of a repressed racial 
minority. Through an African American colleague at Union Theological Seminary named 
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Frank Fisher
38
 that he first came into contact with Abyssinian. Bonhoeffer was so inspired by 
the music there that he took back to Germany recordings of spirituals and piano arrangements 
by James Weldon Johnson, given to him by Fisher.
39
  
 
 
    His attraction to the spirituals was not cursory, either; Bonhoeffer felt it expressed 
something of the worldliness within religious experience. As another Harlem Renaissance 
philosopher he came across—Alain Locke—assessed years later the ‘sorrow songs’, behind 
the “broken language, childish imagery, and peasant simplicity was an epic intensity and a 
tragic depth of religious emotion for which the only equal seems to have been the spiritual 
experience of the Jews, and for which the only analogue is the Psalms.”40 To use an adage 
within the African American church relating to the spirituals, and as Bonhoeffer would have 
acutely observed, the spirituals are unrepentantly ‘bad grammar’, but behind the poetry is 
‘good grace’. 
 
 
    J. Deotis Roberts asserts that, with Fisher as a partner, Bonhoeffer experienced the sacred 
and secular aspects of life in Harlem.
41
 At Union he experienced the literary and 
philosophical edge of the Harlem Renaissance; by night he experienced the culture of the 
Harlem Renaissance. Bonhoeffer began to learn jazz improvisation and the pathos of the 
blues.
42
 Then there was the night life: the dancing, heavy drinking and smoking, definitely 
prostitution or consumption of illegal substances, and a form of making music he might have 
only experienced if the classically-trained pianist-turned-pastor had ever visited any of 
Berlin’s burgeoning cabaret clubs in the 1920’s. But he also saw a type of community one 
would not have seen outside the walls of the Cotton Club: whites and blacks found together 
in the same place dancing. In the United States, where racial segregation was a tradition 
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within and outside the Church,
43
 the sacred and the profane mingled reflexively. In the 
thought of Locke and duBois, it was the intensity of consciousness which signalled the genius 
of ‘organic’ jazz and blues (as opposed to the commercialisation of jazz which cheapened its 
effects).
44
 It was where religiously devout musicians like Duke Ellington could, almost in the 
same breath, make a musical commentary on the ominous quality of love found in the blues, 
the “lust” of love in ballads, and the “divinity” of love in what came to be called his “Sacred 
Music”. 
 
 
    Holland suggests that Bonhoeffer was able to take away a mode of spiritual development 
that could serve as an alternative to the Gefuhl (religious feeling) which characterised 
pietistic German Christianity.
45
 An increasing number of scholars suggest that it is in this 
environment that Bonhoeffer found a potent manifestation of a community formed and 
framed “from below”, an essential expression of the “community of saints”.46 Living in New 
York during the German church’s reassessment of Luther 47 , the “Protestantism without 
Reformation” which he admired in the social witness and culture of African Americans no 
doubt became a sign of the worldly Christianity he saw as rooted in the “this worldliness” of 
Luther’s faith.  
 
 
     Bonhoeffer was often warned against being too ‘adventurous’ with his theological 
discovery in America by those close to him at home—namely his father Karl-Fredrich and 
Karl Barth. Barth’s displeasure of Gandhi’s distinctive religious difference resulted in 
Bonhoeffer cancelling an otherwise-desired trip to study non-violent resistance in India in the 
1930’s—he also missed what might have been a life-altering trip to New Orleans, the 
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undisputed birthplace of jazz.
48
 Before Harlem, Bonhoeffer may or may not not have ever 
heard jazz in Germany, for there it was early on associated with “nigger culture”, a culture in 
no association with what was classified reactionary German conservatism as ‘High German 
art’. In spite of this label, composers like Kurt Weil had popularised jazz consciousness in the 
waning days of the Weimar Republic, syncretising it with the opera, lieder and orchestral 
traditions with which Germans were most familiar. Jazz was also linked with the liberalising 
politics of Weimar and other Jewish composers like Arnold Schoenberg, Paul Hindemith, and 
Ernst Krenek, who advocated a post-war internationalism.
49
 It was because of these 
associations that jazz music and that of all the others was promptly banned when the Nazis 
came to power.
50
 Whether he had ever experienced the Weimar-era jazz scene or not, these 
were Bonhoeffer’s first experiences of organic jazz where it initially was popularised. He was 
very taken by jazz—and her ‘mother’, the Spirituals of the African American Church.  
 
 
    My exploration into Bonhoeffer’s interest in jazz is a further development on the tendency 
in Bonhoeffer’s thought toward art which speaks honestly to the boundaries between light 
and dark, beyond the essence of simply giving comfort. In learning jazz improvisation 
Bonhoeffer could have discovered not only the relationship between black music and 
European music, but also the sense in which music—like Christian discourse in a world come 
of age—is an unfinished or fragmentary experience, dependent on what the pianist Bill Evans 
called a “introspective” perspective of performance rather than blueprint model.51 Being free 
from a prospective way of creativity is not liberating when one has nothing to say—musically 
or theologically—and especially when one has not mastered the foundations of the instrument 
or the language. Music created spontaneously in this context runs the risk of losing relevance, 
not being musical at all no matter how tonal and in tune it may be. As we move into 
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Bonhoeffer’s larger world of aesthetic inspiration, the conflict between light and dark, 
foundational and fragmentary will be emphasised.  
 
Revolt from Neo-classicism 
 
    His particular appreciation for jazz taken for granted, Bonhoeffer in contrast had harsh 
sentiments for the nineteenth century Neo-classicism which for the most part served as the 
inspiration of the conservatism of imperial and fascist Europe. As we have already 
mentioned, as early as SC he possessed an aversion to neo-classicism as an intrinsic part of 
the worship culture in German churches. For him these expressions of a purism and, as he 
would call it later, a “noble simplicity”52, took away from the real social situation of the 
church: it maintained the status of the church as the spiritual community of the bourgeoisie. 
Yet he often possesses a contradictory sentiment between music which is meant for human 
expression and the worship of God. 
 
 
    As pastor of the German-speaking church in London, he introduced that congregation to 
the Hymnal for German parishes abroad
53
, a hymnal noted for its variety of sources, not just 
in German hymnody but also the continental Reformed tradition and divergent theological 
sentiments.
54
 In the dedication sermon for the hymnals on Cantate Sunday, 1934
55
 
Bonhoeffer focused on the diversity of expression in German church music. One can presume 
that he is very aware by this time of how central a place music is in shaping the culture of the 
Third Reich, and He begins by painting a picture of one’s first experience of music in some 
Reformed churches, with the centre piece being the “thunderous sound of the organ” and the 
contradicting element in sacred music. It is an experience of “turmoil” which inspires within 
the listening feelings of awe, fear and an inward drawing into the sacred space, the presence 
of God.
56
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    Bonhoeffer contrasts this turmoil with the experience of people in other Reformed 
traditions which do not utilise music in the church as it may take precedence over the Word. 
The first experience of organ music can cause, even in them “a quiet anxiety and horror”.57  
In this sermon he seems to be warning against music as being utilised for its “outward beauty 
at the expense of true ‘inner beauty’”.58  Bonhoeffer’s query is whether music divorced from 
The sacrament of Word (theological language) and ethical context can truly speak to human 
experience.  
 
 
    Another contrast Bonhoeffer makes is on music which expresses the contradictory 
sufferings and loves of humanity and nature, against music which specifically expresses the 
depth and worshipfulness of God, in God’s own pain and suffering. “How near is it to 
blasphemy”, he says, “to take the man in a carpenter’s smock, with his plain, clear, simple, 
functional words, and celebrate him with such a rich and splendid human work of art that it 
makes us forget the poverty and humility of Jesus Christ.”59 Here again, he lifts up the 
influence of neo-classicism in church aesthetic culture, with an emphasis on beauty rather 
than on the depth found in real spiritual experience.  
 
 
    As far as expressing the “beauty” in sacred music, whatever adornment expresses itself in 
the aesthetic experience of worship comes out of the creation of something that will allow the 
Word of God’s “own beauty [to] shine even more gloriously”. 60 The aim of music for 
worship, so Bonhoeffer intimates Luther,
61
 is not to mimic nature solely but to express 
without “ornamentation”, or artifice, the relationship between suffering humanity and a 
suffering God. He likens the authentic relationship between the Word of God and humanity 
as a relationship between a harpist and harp strings: 
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…the human soul is a harp and the word of God, as it touches the soul, is 
the harpist. It is the purity of the harp strings and the extent to which they 
are well tuned that makes the melody sound pure and clear as it comes forth 
from the soul in praise of the harpist. And how often the strings are out of 
tune, how often they produce discord, how often what comes out of our 
mouths sounds as though all the strings are broken, and only a wild, wailing, 
tormented, discordant screech comes from our lips. Certainly it can also 
happen that a storm sweeps across the strings and makes them sound—a 
storm of passion, of rebellion or outrage against one’s fate, or perhaps a 
quiet moaning and crying—and then the song, the music that is heard is 
rather a glorification of ourselves, our passions, our love, our hate, our 
despair, our grief, our sense of power.
62
 
 
    Bonhoeffer takes notice of the strong “contrast” between God and the human condition 
reflected in Reformation-era hymns versus the emphasis in pietist (pre-enlightenment era) 
hymns which he saw as equivalent to neo classicism in its individualism and in its stirring of 
artificial feeling.
63
 Music in which the focus is on “the glory, power, love and grace of God” 
rather than the greatness of human beings cultivates and uncovers the depth in one’s 
relationship with God.
64
 He closes by reflecting on the meaning of singing a “new” song unto 
the Lord. It is the sound which awakens one into the presence of God, and suggests that this 
is best experienced “in the night of our lives, of our suffering and our fear, in the night of our 
death.”65 The “new song” in Bonhoeffer’s mind is “the purest, sweetest, hardest, and most 
violent of all songs” perhaps because it calls one not simply to look upon one’s humanity but 
also upon one’s relationship, conflicting as it is, with God. 
 
 
    In his assessment of composers, Bonhoeffer reveals one inconsistency. In speaking of the 
difference between God (“the harpist”) as the centre of music against “human-centred” 
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music, he points to Bach’s signatures at the end of his music (soli deo Gloria-To the glory of 
God alone or Jesu juva-help us, Jesus), whereas the music of Beethoven “seems to be nothing 
but the eternal expression of human suffering and passion.”66  This is why Tolstoy felt that 
Beethoven should not be heard by “good people” as it would inflame their passions.67 We 
have already seen that he just as well leaves room for criticism of Bach as he does to praise 
his work. With Beethoven it is no different; in prison (27 March 1944) he reminisces on 
listening to Beethoven’s C minor Piano Sonata, stating that he is coming toward an 
“existential appreciation” for his music. Exactly a year in prison now,68 Bonhoeffer speaks of 
the art of listening inwardly to music: “When one listens with the inner ear alone and gives 
oneself up to it utterly, [music] can be almost more beautiful than when heard physically. It’s 
purer, all the dross falls away, and it seems to take on a ‘new body’.”69 
 
 
    In Ethics Bonhoeffer describes the relation of the world to Christ within four fundamental 
“mandates: labour, marriage, government, and the church.”70  In Letters and Papers from 
Prison he considers the misplacement of art in the fundamental “mandates” of German life 
(marriage, labour, state and church). He suggests that bildung (culture, education) is a broad 
category, much maligned as an area of labour, nevertheless crucial as it is subsumed within 
culture, education, even religious life. He suggests that the church should be included in this 
area of spielraum, as in, ‘room or space to play’, but just as easily can be translated as 
‘freedom’ or even ‘margin’. He also criticises the notion of art in the Third Reich as relegated 
to “a museum piece”, and asserts that cultural and intellectual life (geistige existenz) has 
become a “torso”71, an incomplete body thus misplaced by the dominant society. As an aspect 
of the sphere of free play, surrounding the ethical sphere, culture and education gains a new 
freedom with respect to the Word. 
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Fragmentariness 
 
    In prison, Bonhoeffer adapts what Pangritz calls a “new theological status of music”72 
through an examination of these mandates and particularly through the fragmentariness of 
music. Biblically speaking, for Bonhoeffer music has been a product of Cain’s impetus 
toward labour and civilisation.
73
 The city, as a microcosm of “the city of God”, needed music 
in order to see God.  For Bonhoeffer this perspective disregards the imperfection of the 
human condition,
74
 and music so taken as only serving the word of God. Bonhoeffer, 
however, conceives music within the notion of “free play”: not art asserting an ethical 
standpoint but rather “surrounding” the ethical sphere.75 Music, then achieves freedom by its 
foundation within the revealed divine Word. The integrated work of labour, however, is 
imperfect for the crisis it presents, namely that it is “the race of Cain that is to fulfil this 
mandate, and that is what casts the darkest shadow over all human labour.” 
 
 
    Bonhoeffer sees the incompleteness of Bach’s The Art of Fugue – a work begun both at the 
end of Bach’s life (and left hauntingly unfinished) and within the context of severe crisis in 
the culture of the Reformed Germany — in parallel to Germany’s current situation and 
future: “The longer we are uprooted from our professional activities and our private lives, the 
more we feel how fragmentary our lives are, compared with those of our parents.” 76 
Bonhoeffer laments that, because of the disappearance of intellectual depth in education, “our 
cultural life remains a torso. The important thing today is that we should be able to discern 
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from the fragment of our life how the whole was arranged and planned, and what material it 
consists of.”77 
 
 
     In speaking of fragmentariness Bonhoeffer is not referring to the fragment as a genre, 
praised by some romantic theories of art in contrast to the classical idea of perfection. He 
speaks of the lives of a generation which have, by the pressure of outward events, been 
“split…into fragments, like bombs falling on houses.” Following the reflection on The Art of 
Fugue he recalls Jeremiah 45, noticing its fragmentary quality: “Here, too, is a necessary 
fragment of life—‘but I will give you your life as a prize of war’. 
 
 
     According to Holness and Wurstenberg, Adorno regards Bach’s attention to memory, 
crucial to understanding and performing any of Bach’s fugues, as an act of resistance to the 
rising commercial subjectivism which were threatening the arts in Prussia.
78
 So the Art of 
Fugue in particular represents not only Bach’s reflections on the end of life, but a final social 
statement to the convention of the time, a piece de resistance in its fragmentariness; against 
the growing capitalist forces in musical culture. Historically and theologically, then, 
Bonhoeffer finds relevance in the comparison between the situation of his generation and the 
fragmentariness of The Art of Fugue. Bonhoeffer notices what Adorno would assess later,
79
 
that in fragmentariness new meaning forms:  
 
If our life is but the remotest reflection of such a fragment, if we accumulate, 
at least for a short time, a wealth of themes and weld them into a harmony in 
which the great counterpoint is maintained from start to finish, so that at last, 
when it breaks off abruptly, we can sing no more than the chorale, ‘I come 
before thy throne’, we will not bemoan the fragmentariness of our lives, but 
rather rejoice in it.
80
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    After becoming acquainted with the Prussian composer Heinrich Schutz through his friend 
Eberhard Bethge,
81
 he reflects substantially in his prison letters on Schutz’s Kleine Geistliche 
Konzerte (Little Sacred Concertos). Schutz had composed his settings of the Psalms during 
the Thirty Years War (1618-1648), which proved devastating for Germany’s cultural life82 as 
many artists fought and were killed during this long conflict with the Holy Roman Empire. 
Schutz’s desire for producing large-scale works was cut short because of the lack of 
musicians around. Schutz seems to be the musician of a cultural dark age in the German 
states of the seventeenth century, all the more so adamant on bringing to light the musica 
poetica of the Psalms; that is, through the intense relationship between word and ‘notation’.  
 
 
    The relevance of Schutz’s music for Bonhoeffer’s context was not lost on him at all, and 
one can assess that the music forged not only a bridge between Word and music/art which 
Bonhoeffer has alluded to in, say, his Cantate Sunday sermon of 1934, but also a sense of the 
inner and outer trauma of human experience, a mourning for those who have suffered, 
mourning for the sufferer, and mourning for that which brings vitality but which suffers with 
the artist. In the case of Bonhoeffer, that source of vitality is art as well as the Church. As 
Pangritz suggests,
83
 and Bonhoeffer intimates,
84
 the memory of the Schutz’s settings retain a 
prominent place in his ‘inner ear’:  
 
In the setting of Psalm 3 the line “I laid me down and slept,” descending to 
the extreme depth and contrasted by rapidly ascending melodic leaps on “I 
awakened”; in the same setting the fiercely dentated melodic figure on “thou 
hast broken the teeth of the ungodly”…Bonhoeffer cites [in Augustine’s 
hymn “O sweet, o kindly, o good Lord Jesus”] the ascending melodic figure 
of seven notes on occasion of the exclamation “o,” languishing for union 
with Christ, in the line “o how my soul longs for you.”…the language of the 
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hymn is coloured by erotic associations, when it continues, “My helper, you 
have ensnared my heart/ With your love/ That I yearn for you without 
end…”85 
 
    It is Schutz’s music which shows Bonhoeffer’s devotion to the music of the late Middle 
Ages. Unlike the “worldliness” of the Renaissance or of the Enlightenment, the worldliness 
of the Middle Ages was thoroughly Christian. Thus this worldliness was biblical because it 
did not separate human nature into inner and outer spheres, but sought to understand human 
life for its wholeness. It is here, before the Renaissance retrieved classical values, “the 
fundamental concepts of humanism—humanity, tolerance, gentleness, and moderation” were 
present and more accessible. This was important for Bonhoeffer because, as he states, he 
wanted to “start from the premise that God shouldn’t be smuggled into some last secret place, 
but that we should frankly recognise that the world, and people, have come of age, that we 
shouldn’t run man down in his worldliness, but confront him with God at his strongest 
point.”86 That is why Bonhoeffer questions whether the classics provide the only foundation 
for education. A “mature worldliness,” requires much more than an elitist retrieval of 
classical antiquity; it requires both a return to the biblical understanding of human wholeness 
and a much broader perspective of the world that comes through an appreciation of diversity. 
 
Polyphony and Discipleship 
 
    Though he mentions it on a few sparse occasions in his prison writings, Bonhoeffer’s 
conception of “polyphony of life” is greatly representative of the impact of music on his 
theology and the deep expression of diversity and community which he seeks to manifest; not 
merely the aesthetic experience of music or for the general enrichment of human experience. 
By the time he is in prison, although he admits he has never really distanced himself from all 
of the liberal fragments which gave him a foundation, he has effectively distanced himself 
from the bourgeois social order. By “polyphony of life” he recognises that the practice and 
process of music-making are directly related to the Christian imperative of discipleship to 
which he has referred since SC. The multidimensional Christian community in the world, a 
spiritual community shaped and transformed by the primal boundaries individuals share calls 
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the church, as Bonhoeffer states, to “make room in ourselves, to some extent, for God and the 
whole world”.87   The practice of repentance serves to create within us a more “wholly 
present” life in the reality that we experience this life in fragments. Within the 
“fragmentariness” of our lives, the being present in the human struggle between “the beauty 
and troubles of the world and the “fragmentary and incomplete nature” of our existence in it, 
God is weaving the “mosaic” of a new human community.88  
 
 
    I think that there is a relation between the tragic chorus and Bonhoeffer’s ecclesiology in a 
way which gives a broader understanding to his understanding of worldly discipleship as a 
life of polyphonic interaction.  A polyphonic Christian community shares similarities with the 
classic idea of the “tragic chorus” in that the Christian community, performing the faith in 
witness, worship and struggle in the world are not mere citizen-spectators; the tragic chorus 
are characterised as people who are able to discern the tragic reality of the situation at hand, 
providing a warning and alternative to the world of the tragic hero. As Bushnell states, the 
chorus is “socially and ritually rooted in the spatio-temporal context of dramatic 
action…geographically and culturally decentred” for the sake of giving meaning to an 
action.
89
   
 
 
    The activity of Christ within the Church community is embodied by that community’s 
participation in the awareness of suffering through the being of Jesus.
90
 Mature this-
worldliness for Bonhoeffer means “living unreservedly in life’s duties, problems, successes 
and failures, experiences and perplexities.”91 This-worldliness calls for the acceptance of the 
provisional—rather than static— quality of all human creations and institutions. 
 
                                                          
87
 LPP, 310.  
 
88
 Ibid. 
 
89
 C. Calame, “The Tragic Choral Group: Dramatic Roles and Social Functions” in R Bushnell (ed., 2005), A 
Companion to Tragedy. Malden, MA: Blackwell Publishing, 229-230. 
 
90
 R. K Wurstenberg (2008), Bonhoeffer and Beyond: Promoting a Dialogue between Religion and Politics. 
Frankfurt: Peter Lang, 17. 
 
91
 LPP, 202. 
 56 
 
 
    Bonhoeffer's movement away from Christianity as a system leads him into the paradox of 
multiplicity and stability. He asks how we can move beyond compartmentalization—
“[reserving] some space for God” 92  —with its rigid order and beyond a boundless 
fragmentation that has no order. As the metaphor of polyphony suggests, a polyphonic 
understanding of the meaning of Christianity allows one to work at the intersection of 
situations and structures: 
 
I wonder whether it is possible (it almost seems so today) to regain the idea 
of the church as providing an understanding of the area of freedom (art, 
education, freedom, play), so that Kierkegaard’s ‘aesthetic existence’ would 
not be banished from the church’s sphere, but would be re-established in it. I 
really think that it is so, and it would mean that we should recover a link 
with the Middle Ages.
93 
 
 
    Here, he envisions a cultural dynamic where all above ‘areas’ of freedom and free-thinking 
are complementary and engaging with one another, and where the delusion of romanticism—
that aesthetic pleasure alone can “heal the brokenness of our lives”94—is countered by a 
creative imagination which comes to terms with “ethics, guilt, suffering” and the transience 
of time.
95
  Bonhoeffer wants to step out of the ethical binary of right and wrong and into a 
kind of thinking that embraces the ambiguity of engaging in community. The relation of ones 
love for God and the diversity of loves that shapes the rest of human life.
96
 
 
It is a life of ‘worldliness’ – not the worldliness of the secularist, denying 
God, nor the worldliness of a certain kind of aesthete, fleeing responsibility, 
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but a fully down-to-earth kind of Christian life that can include free, 
‘aesthetic existence’ (friendship, art, etc.) while also being ethically alert 
and responsible.”97 
 
In all of the musical images Bonhoeffer encounters—from learning jazz improvisation in 
Harlem to his reflection on Bach and Schutz—he seems to be searching for the impact of 
polyphonic devices on the music and on how it places into perspective for Bonhoeffer his 
situation. It is polyphony after all, not structure, which makes the music potent enough to be 
explored and improvised beyond monophonic chant. As Pembroke asserts, a pastoral 
perspective based on polyphony challenges a dualist way of theological reflection because it 
embraces the complexities of space and distance.
98
 To Bonhoeffer, this polyphonic idea 
serves as an alternative to the idea of the fixed structures of established Christianity. He does 
not negate the utility of an ecclesiastical cantus firmus—a set melody and therefore set 
dogma and tradition. Yet melody is what is called for in order to keep the music truly 
expansive. A Church with a healthy and melodious cantus firmus retains an interest in her 
“melody”, yet expansive enough to create space for other innovations in the collective voice.  
 
  Discipleship then becomes an exploration in foundation and instrument, substance and form. 
By moving away from Christianity solely as a “formula for negotiating life” 99  without 
thought and for addressing the world around us, he deliberately suggests the inevitability of 
conflict with one’s interpretation and practice of the set melody.  
 
Tragedy and prophetic pathos 
 
    Bonhoeffer’s discussion of Greek Tragedy in Ethics is crucial because it is in Ethics that 
one finds the heart of Bonhoeffer’s deliberations concerning guilt. It is here that he coins an 
idea that has been at the heart of his writings all along, namely “acceptance of guilt” and the 
problem of knowing about the righteousness of one’s actions. Even in his discussion of 
tragedy here, he seems to be conflicted about the essence of it. Bonhoeffer finds the essence 
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of tragedy in unity of irreconcilably contradictory laws; Christian life, however, is 
characterised by a unity “which is not tragic at all.” Because of the reconciliation of the world 
with God in Christ, reconciled life is not marked by the inescapability of guilt but by 
simplicity, for Christ alone makes possible human action that does not lose itself in endless 
irreconcilable conflicts of principles. 
 
 
    One wonders if Bonhoeffer really means what he says, for whilst speaking of a 
transcendence of tragedy through Christ, Bonhoeffer also describes the situation of the 
Grenzfall. He refers to the possibility of a conflict between the observance of the formal law 
of a state or any other thing and the inevitable necessities of human life. Here, Bonhoeffer 
states, one becomes inevitably guilty—either by acting against a formal law or by not acting 
in free responsibility—and in either case one can rely on God’s grace and forgiveness. The 
implications for accepting guilt seem obvious; however, whilst his critique of Greek Tragedy 
can be based on Bonhoeffer’s analysis of the Third Reich’s strong Hellenist influence, he 
does step over this aversion in some places. For instance, his section on freedom argues that 
responsible action “must decide not simply between right and wrong, good and evil, but 
between right and right, wrong and wrong.” This renders the choice of irreconcilable 
alternatives in the sense of Greek Tragedy not only a tangible possibility but even an 
inevitability.
100
  
 
 
    The most significant clue Bonhoeffer gives us that he does not completely dismiss the 
sense of the tragic in a church community wrestling with a “world come of age” is his earlier 
perspectives on the Hebrew prophetic phenomenon.
101
 His 1936 lecture entitled “The 
Tragedy of the Prophetic and Its Lasting Meaning” is the first of three 1928 lectures during 
his associate pastorate in Barcelona. With the title of the series being “Crisis and Hope in the 
Contemporary Situation”, 102  this first lecture focuses on the “profoundly contemporary” 
implications of the poetry and charisma of Hebrew prophetism. He begins by addressing the 
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crisis of identity—even in 1928—within global society. It must be noted at first glance that 
the crisis he describes is not specifically a “German crisis”, but rather one which is best 
expressed from a more cosmopolitan perspective. The centre of the crisis as he sees it is, once 
again the “bourgeois parquet floor” which has been pulled out, leaving more questions and 
fewer answers.  
 
Who among us dares to answer unequivocally the question about the 
meaning of Europe’s contemporary fate? Or who can claim to have 
found the right path, the one and only appropriate path? Who dares to 
make blanket judgements about the burning problems of ethics, the 
question of the right to wage war, the problem of economic competition, 
concerning the new social order, the education of the new generation, or 
the mysteries of sexuality?
103
 
 
    It is for a congregation of ex-patriots—not theology students but many young Germans—
Bonhoeffer in passionately simple language suggests that in order to retrieve a sense of 
“traces of God” 104  a recovery of the “mood” of the Hebrew prophets and the parallels 
between biblical history and the present.  
 
    The “convulsive moment” where someone who has “wrestled with God and with their own 
age” becomes taken over by the calling of God “and now cannot help but go out among the 
people and proclaim God’s will” is the genesis of the prophetic phenomenon. This is the 
tragedy of course: Bonhoeffer consistently refers to the sense of the “terror” in the life of the 
prophet, the poetry born out of the reality that speaking the Word of God to one’s own time 
may lead “to his own undoing or ultimately to his own death.” After reciting Amos 3: 4—8, 
Bonhoeffer commentates in a way that resembles one of his sermons: 
 
Amos lay out in the distant steppe; he had heard of the wickedness and 
injustice of life in the city. The one day, as he looked out across the 
infinite steppe in the searing midday sun, God Yahweh frightened him in 
a vision. He saw a terrifying, threatening cloud coming, and when it was 
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close to him he saw that it was a cloud of locusts descending upon the 
fields and decimating them. Amos fell to the ground and cried out, O 
Lord our God, forgive, I beg you! How can Israel stand? He is so small!” 
Twice more Amos is startled by visions. In one, he sees a man striding 
with a shower of fire amid lush grain fields, and again Amos falls down 
with the cry, “O Lord God…” in the next vision, he sees a man with a 
plumbline standing on a fallen wall and measuring the uneven places; 
Amos hears Yahweh say that just as he has destroyed this fallen wall, so 
also will he destroy the people of Israel. This is Amos’s calling. He 
rushes away toward the city, where he emerges as a prophet of Yahweh; 
and he proves himself to be a genuine prophet—this is an important 
point—by delivering a message of disaster, misfortune, and 
judgement.
105
 
 
    With Amos as well as Isaiah and Jeremiah he describes the duty of the prophet to embody 
Divine pathos
106
 not simply for God’s sake, but for the people’s. After all, prophets are both 
“the most ardent patriots imaginable—and yet know that he is speaking to deaf ears; indeed, 
even worse, his own prophesy will increasingly provoke the evil itself, make it even more 
evident, and in so doing bring the day of judgement ever closer. Hence the prophetic calling 
itself already spins the thread to its end and clearly determines his path beforehand.”107   
 
 
    As Bonhoeffer has detailed the ‘tragic’ cause into being of the ‘poor soul’ called to deliver 
God’s message, he also describes or proposes the Divinely inspired effect: that it exposes the 
“deamons” in the human psyche. 108  To utilise a theme most common to Bonhoeffer’s 
thought, the many-layered tragic sense of the prophetic interchange is a personal project. 
“God causes the tragedy of the prophetic life so that in this human defeat the power, claim, 
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and burden of the divine demands can be seen in the full light of day.”  The tragedy of the 
prophetic is ultimately ones “unavoidable undoing”.109 
 
 
    Bonhoeffer’s reference in the lecture to two of the great tragedists of different points of 
Germanic Romanticism—Goethe’s Torquato Tasso110 and Stefan Zweig’s play Jeremias111--
are small, but significant enough to get a sense of the kind of connections Bonhoeffer wants 
to make with tragic in the aesthetic sense and in the biblical sense. Goethe’s historical tragedy 
based on the life of the Renaissance poet Tasso, whose epic 1580 poem La Gerusalem 
Liberata told primarily of the “intrapersonal” moral conflicts surrounding the wars of the 
First Crusade, was the beginning of the revival of tragedy for the Romantic era, becoming a 
centre of influence in the works of the likes of Byron and the opera composer Donizetti. 
Goethe’s narrative, similar to Unamuno’s plot in Peace in War, is a story of Tasso’s 
“personal fate”112 as the Pope’s ‘poet laureate’113 in a time of war, rather than the larger 
political situation. Goethe’s vision of the poet as the radical who refuses the life of luxury and 
being “at the beck and call” of impatient tyrannical aristocrats114 must have stuck out to this 
young pastor wishing to deconstruct bourgeois impassiveness. The prophet for him can be 
seen distinctively as an non-conformed artist; or, to use the title of a sermon by Martin Luther 
King, a “conformed non-conformist”. 
 
 
    Zweig, a Jewish contemporary of Bonhoeffer and a liberettist for Richard Strauss, 
completed his dramatic depiction of the Hebrew prophet in 1917 as one of the few examples 
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of art actually created during World War I. Rather than being a post-war pacifist message 
representative of much of inter-war literature,
115
 Jeremias comes across as another story 
which tells of the individual lives who live in the thick of the conflict, as a consequence of 
the bigger picture. As Bonhoeffer describes the role of the prophet as a “patriot” imprisoned 
by the angst of God, so Zweig seeks to portray the tension within “the person who loves his 
land, his child, his brother-human, and that other person who at any opportunity forgets his 
natural inclination for peaceful labour and quiet joy, and becomes wild and blood-thirsty, 
baring his wolfish teeth.”116  
 
 
    The prophets as bearers of the Divine pathos do not hold a prominent presence in 
Bonhoeffer’s body of work. Yet the genius of this particular lecture is revealed further when 
seen in association with the other two in the series. Though they seem to be dealing with 
distinctive categories in Christian thought—the second lecture being the more well-known on 
Christology and secularisation whilst the third are initial ideas Bonhoeffer later develops in 
Ethics—it is difficult to read them in the unity that they were meant to be heard and not get a 
sense of how the prophetic phenomenon——relates in Bonhoeffer’s mind to the aesthetic, 
Christological and ethical necessities of Christian community.  
 
 
    The second lecture, which shows appreciation for Harnack’s work,117  asserts that the 
essence of Christianity is found in its message about the sovereign God, “removed from the 
world”, using the ground of God’s being to emphasise “the infinite worth of that which is 
seemingly worthless and the infinite worthlessness of that which is seemingly valued.” It is 
once again against the disjointedness of enlightenment thought and culture to which 
Bonhoeffer seeks to save Christianity from. The union of body and spirit—which he again 
emphasises as a Jewish idea
118
--is important because of the way in which this perception of 
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human life peers into the depths of human experience; or as he calls it, “the tragedy of” 
human life: 
 
Christianity is neither congenial to culture nor does it have faith in progress. 
It has peered too deeply into the two deepest realities of life. The trembling 
fear of death and guilt has seized Christianity too powerfully. The 
seriousness of having to die and of having to bear guilt—this universal 
human fate is too frightening to allow any hope in solutions deriving from 
human initiative. Christians see a terrible rift running through the world, a 
rift that is utterly irreparable through recourse to any human initiative; and 
they see this rift—thus the tragedy of their lives—still or even for the first 
time in its full scope precisely at the heights of human initiative, that is, in 
culture itself.
119
 
 
    The third lecture on ethics can be seen as a further development on his image of the 
prophet as a “patriot” who answers the call from God after reflecting historically when he 
states, “ethics is a matter of blood and a matter of history…it is a child of the earth and for 
that reason its face changes with history as well as with the renewal of blood, with the 
transition between generations.”120 This transitory nature of moral investigation is very much 
akin to his opening statements in Ethics about the nature of a Christian ethic being dependent 
on how best to participate in “the indivisible whole of God’s reality.”121  
 
 
Worldy Christianity as existential tension 
 
    Bonhoeffer and Unamuno share synergies on their conception of the nature of history as 
fluid and transitory; Bonhoeffer’s understanding of the ethical consciousness of the Hebrew 
prophet draws parallels with Unamuno’s concept of intrahistory as an investigation into the 
collective unconsciousness. For Unamuno, history should be interested in the routes whose 
principle leading roles are played by its peripheral actors; that is to say, the paths followed by 
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those men who make history in an unconscious manner, by those who do not aspire to the 
title of heroes. And so the writer places his bets on the "living tradition", the paradoxical 
tradition of the present. 
 
 
    Bonhoeffer views the maturation of the ‘collective consciousness’—“the world come of 
age”—as indicative of the rhythm of God’s presence. Instead of a god whose presence is 
made known in archaically ‘pious’ ways, the community is forced to look more deeply into 
the reality of the human suffering that is too often veiled in artifice. As the aesthetics of a 
‘wholesome god’ are eclipsed by a ‘worldly’ faith, the church comes to express a God who is 
indeed ‘true and living’:  
 
…we cannot be honest unless we recognise that we have to live in the world 
etsi deus non daretur… 122  So our coming of age leads us to a true 
recognition of our situation before God. God would have us know that we 
must live as men who manage our lives without him. The God who is with 
us is the God who forsakes us (Mark 15:34). The God who lets us live in the 
world without the working hypothesis of God is the God before whom we 
stand continually. Before God and with God we live without God. God lets 
himself be pushed out of the world on to the cross.
123
 
 
His usage of Grotius’ famous phrase is interpreted in the context of his plea to develop a 
conception of ministry, not in the normal spheres of morality, politics and science, but in a 
context where the Church is able to cultivate and transform her “mental integrity” honestly.124 
The “divine death” in Bonhoeffer’s work is not absolute; it is the death of “a false conception 
of god” hereafter abolished by the “world come of age”. In this sense Bonhoeffer is wary of a 
blind “Quixotry”: 
 
The will to be good exists only as desire for the reality that is real in God. A 
desire to be good for its own sake, as some sort of personal goal or life 
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vocation, falls prey to an ironic unreality; honest striving for good turns into 
the ambitious striving of the paragon of virtue. Good as such is no 
independent theme for life. To take it as such would be the craziest Don 
Quixotry.
125
 
 
    The modern popularity of Quixote in Spain was witnessed by Bonhoeffer whilst pastoring 
in Barcelona. It is not known to what extent he understood the diversity of interpretations of 
Latin “Quixotism”; but he did see a film version, acquiring Cervantes’ novel soon after.126 
For the Spanish thinkers like Unamuno, of course, Quixote was the paradigm of the tragic 
soul who has, in a sense, lost his mind for seeking ancient things. For Unamuno, faith, 
history, immortality are everlasting dominants. Bonhoeffer, however, longs for a Christian 
faith deeper than the ancient. Thus he cannot agree with a popular interpretation of being 
‘good for the sake of it’. In other words, the former spheres of life within which Christianity 
possessed power and from which the powers that be sought to pervert and exploit can no 
longer be tolerated. One can, however, gain from Quixote a sense of mental and spiritual 
suffering: 
 
The perennial figure of Don Quixote has become contemporary, the ‘knight 
of doleful countenance’ who, with a shaving basin for a helmet and a 
miserable hack for a charger, rides into endless battle for the chosen lady of 
his heart who doesn’t even exist. This is the adventurous enterprise of an old 
world against a new one, of a past reality against a contemporary one, of a 
noble dreamer against the overpowering force of the commonplace…In the 
second part….the author takes sides with the mean world, laughing at its 
hero. It is too cheap to deride the weapons that we have inherited from our 
ancestors, with which they achieved great things, but that are not sufficient 
for the present struggle. Only the mean-spirited can read the fate of Don 
Quixote without sharing in and being moved by it…Only the person who 
combines simplicity with wisdom can endure.”127 
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Although Bonhoeffer takes the ‘absurdity’ and antiquity of Quixote as something of a risk 
factor in establishing a worldly Christianity, it is at any community’s own expense that one 
fails to see the simple wisdom of history. This is why he comes to the conclusion that 1.) The 
confrontation of the Christian community with the world - “action in accordance with Christ” 
– always involves a conflict of wills,128  and 2.) That Christianity Owes more to Greek 
philosophy and art than she would like to admit. 
 
In the early church and the Middle Ages, tragedies do not exist. But even 
the most recent Protestant ethics still portrays the intractable conflict of the 
Christian in the world, coloured by a dark pathos. In its claim to depict 
ultimate realities, there is certainly no doubt that Protestant ethics is firmly 
under the spell of antiquity without being aware of the fact. It is not Luther 
but Aeschylus, Sophocles, and Euripides who have given human life this 
tragic aspect. Luther’s seriousness is completely different from the 
seriousness of those classical tragedians. What must ultimately be taken 
seriously in the view of the Bible and in Luther’s view is not the conflict 
between the gods as expressed in their laws, but the unity of God and the 
reconciliation of the world with God in Jesus Christ; not the inevitability of 
becoming guilty, but the plain and simple life that flows from reconciliation; 
not fate, but the gospel as the ultimate reality of life; not the cruel triumph 
of the gods over the perishing human being, but the election of human 
beings as children of God in the midst of the world reconciled by grace.
129
 
 
Bonhoeffer is not saying that there is no Christian tragedy, but that the tragedy the 
Christian encounters is one which is not based on laws any “number of laws”.130 The only 
things that counts is the gospel and the commensurability of human beings through God. Our 
real conflict lies in our decision as to what type of Christian people we will become – 
Bonhoeffer notes  two: “different forms of secularism”131, one of which Bonhoeffer would 
have recognised as the secular Christianity with which he has a conflicted relationship, the 
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other being “religious enthusiasm”, a grotesque version of which he saw in the Nazi-
supported Christianity and theologians. However, reconciliation causes a conflict in itself as 
our actions, in accord with reality, are limited by our “creatureliness”. We are bound by our 
surrender to God, and at the same time limited by history and the future, as well as the 
emotions, behaviours, and responsible action of other people: after all, reconciliation can only 
be apprehended in community.
132
  
 
 
For Bonhoeffer it is not responsible to stand completely on the side of resistance or 
submission without the wisdom to know the difference. So the boundaries between resistance 
and submission can’t be determined as a matter of principle, but “both must be there and both 
must be seized resolutely.” 133  The problem of resistance and submission is a quality 
Bonhoeffer saw as the defect of his own bourgeois background. There, the aristocratic 
community, pantheons of high culture and intelligence that they were, had resembled the 
extreme form of what Unamuno called “Quixotism”.  
 
…it is still a moot point whether it is ethically more responsible to behave 
like Don Quixote and enter the lists against a new age, or to admit one's 
defeat, accept the new age and agree to serve it. In the last resort success 
makes history, and the Disposer of history is always bringing good out of 
evil over the heads of the history- makers. To ignore the ethical significance 
of success is to betray a superficial acquaintance with history and a 
defective sense of responsibility. So it is all to the good that we have been 
forced for once to grapple seriously with this problem of the ethics of 
success. All the time goodness is successful we can afford the luxury of 
regarding success as having no ethical significance. But the problem arises 
when success is achieved by evil means. It is no good then behaving as an 
arm-chair critic and disputing the issue, for that is to refuse to face the facts. 
Nor is opportunism any help, for that is to capitulate before success. We 
must be determined not to be outraged critics or mere opportunists. We must 
take our full share of responsibility for the moulding of history, whether it 
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be as victors or vanquished. It is only by refusing to allow any event to 
deprive us of our responsibility for history, because we know that is a 
responsibility laid upon us by God, that we shall achieve a relation to the 
events of history far more fruitful than criticism or opportunism. To talk 
about going down fighting like heroes in face of certain defeat is not really 
heroic at all, but a failure to face up to the future. The ultimate question the 
man of responsibility asks is not, How can I extricate myself heroically from 
the affair? but, How is the coming generation to live? It is only in this way 
that fruitful solutions can arise, even if for the time being they are 
humiliating. In short it is easier by far to act on abstract principle than from 
concrete responsibility. The rising generation will always instinctively 
discern which of the two we are acting upon. For it is their future which is at 
stake.
134
 
 
    It was on the watch of fledging republican democracy, which implicitly fought stubbornly 
against change, that Germany had fell into the passions of right-wing extremism. Perhaps 
Bonhoeffer’s own shame and guilt were framed by the reality that he was born of the 
Bildungsburgertum which ultimately “lost their heads and their bibles”. 135  However, 
Bonhoeffer also believed that if faith was to reappear out of the dung-heap of Nazism, it was 
not enough to have a reversal of class power, as was in theory the motive behind National 
Socialism. The secret as Bonhoeffer describes above was what A.N Whitehead described as 
the “dream of youth and the harvest of tragedy” at interplay. That is, ontological dynamic of 
life as untouched by tragedy, innocence and the absence of choices and discernment, and life 
as lived having made choices and facing consequences. Macmurray will make a synergy with 
this ontological dynamic in his rhythm of withdrawal and return. 
 
 
    The most poetic evidence of Bonhoeffer’s understanding of a tragic trajectory in Christian 
reflection comes in the form of his fragmented and unfinished Fiction from Tegel Prison, 
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begun in his first year as there. In a series of fictional anecdotes characteristic of the 
stereotypes and anxieties of German cultural Protestantism, he paints a picture of what 
bourgeois Christianity looks like. In the section entitled Drama, the dignity and honour of 
wounded soldiers are perverted by the insults of hooligan elements in broad daylight.
136
 In 
the section entitled Story, an eighteen year old recipient of the Iron Cross for bravery is 
imprisoned and chained for desertion.
137
  
 
 
    The section entitled Novel focuses on the spiritual journey of a bourgeois family, the 
Brakes, and the corrosive spirit of Christianity. A depressed Frau Brake leaves church on 
Sunday distressed about the sermon. An acquaintance from the church greets her and speaks 
positively about the sermon. She could not recall the content but the sermon was absolutely 
wonderful. For whatever quality of eloquence the sermon possessed, the aristocratic wife 
knew that she had not heard the Gospel.
138
 This was Bonhoeffer’s critique of the anti-
intellectual culture of his Germany and the general lack of prophetic substance therein. 
 
 
    Meanwhile, the two Brake children are confronted with a bad tempered young forester “in 
a kind of uniform wearing inappropriately striking yellow boots”.139  Threatening the grown 
men with violence for trespassing in his ‘neck of the woods’, “Mr. Yellowboots”140 is finally 
confronted by the owner of the estate, a retired army major, who chides the young militant, 
while confessing that it is his class which has made people like the forester possible.
141
 
Bonhoeffer here not only makes a point to characterise the image and attitude of the average 
extremist, or the complicated personality of the retired major, a refined gentleman for whom 
blood is on his hands. This is also a message that the powerful have no conception of what 
true authority is or how it can be practiced.   
                                                          
136
 Ibid., 95. 
 
137
 Ibid., 96. 
 
138
 Moses, 96-7. 
 
139
 Moses, 97. 
 
140
 Moses, 98. 
 
141
 Ibid. 
 
 70 
 
 
 
    Between the major and the Brake boys they realise they share common ground not simply 
on class grounds: their father and the major were close friends during the First World War. 
The relation between the two elder gentlemen and the two boys signify a tragic trajectory, a 
“conflict of wills”. Where the Fiction ends is perhaps adequate enough for closure on 
Bonhoeffer’s tales. The point he is trying to make about the corrosion of cultural 
Protestantism is brought home by one of the sons, Christoph
142
: 
 
 
And who is responsible for this whole calamity? None other than the classes 
that set the tone, the so called upper class, whom everybody sees as a model 
for success in life. And this upper class is for the most part already a bunch 
of rotten, obsequious lackeys; they combine bootlicking towards those 
above and brutality towards those below, lots of rhetoric on the outside and 
decay on the inside. And a few decent individuals and families who could 
play a significant role withdraw into themselves because they're repulsed by 
this vacuous, conceited society.... That is where the problem lies. We need a 
genuine upper class again; but where are we going to find one?
143
 
 
 
Conclusion 
 
    Bonhoeffer’s theology understood the pervasiveness of the tragic sentiment in Christian 
faith, even as he attempted to look beyond it. “Tragedy” is part of the Christian consciousness 
for him, as it is most evident in a world which no longer necessitates Christian consciousness. 
Even if God was a hypothesis, God is most real one in a post Christian context for 
Bonhoeffer. Instead of subscribing to an ‘active resignation’, Bonhoeffer asserts the future-
minded encounter of resistance and submission—in themselves, tragic decisions. With 
Bonhoeffer one can conclude that God doesn’t change; human evaluation of God does 
change as we encounter the reality of existence. This is expressed in the best of war-inflicted 
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art, literature and music; they are expressed and honoured best within the context of religious 
revival: life in the Christian community beyond the ruins.  
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CHAPTER THREE 
John Macmurray and the problem of the Personal 
 
I have, indeed, rejected much that is often considered a part of religion; even 
a necessary part. I have thought it possible that we do not know very clearly 
what religion properly is. I have sought some means to distinguish false 
religion so that I might reject that. But to think of religion as such, and in 
every form, is illusory and pointless has always seemed to me as 
preposterous as it would be to think the same of music.
1
 
 
Self-understanding…involves a long detour through narratives and 
encounters with others, with self-consciousness as the final destination, not 
the starting point.
2
 
 
    The complete picture of existence which guides the philosophy of John Macmurray may be 
read as too positive—an optimism more in line with Emerson3—without an understanding 
that a central ‘antagonist’ in his thought is the place of ‘fear’ in what Macmurray often calls 
‘personal relation’. Perhaps it was fear itself which prevented Macmurray from aligning 
himself with a particular Christian community until formally joining the Society of Friends in 
the 1950’s. With this in mind, I would like to argue that Macmurray’s vision of the unity of 
reflection in art, science and religion is, in the end, not a positive unity at all, but a 
consequence of Christianity in conflict with her original nature. Macmurray sees Christianity 
as infected with the dualist impulse which Unamuno and Bonhoeffer has similarly explored. 
As a result, the Church has been unable to come to full consciousness as a community of 
faith. Macmurray’s vision for Christianity, conceived out of the Hebrew tradition rather than 
the Roman tradition, is important for the recovery of the character and meaning of 
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Christianity in the world. “To understand Christianity”, he says, “it is completely necessary to 
…reconstruct the story of the development of the Hebrew religion.”4 
 
 
    I want to read John Macmurray’s exploration of “the problem of the personal” in light of 
the impact of agonic existence which has been the ‘needle’ weaving this dissertation. Though 
Macmurray does not explicitly detail this problem of “preserving and extending a sense of 
community”5 as tragic, his philosophy of paradox parallels with Martin Buber, who spoke 
himself of his well-known I-Thou dynamic as revealing a basic tragedy of human existence. 
Buber’s dynamic is the very thing which Macmurray states as part of the problematic of 
personal relations. Martin Friedman noted in his definitive study of Buber’s thought that, 
rather than John Macmcurray being influenced by Buber, was one of a few Christian thinkers 
(along with Ebner, Marcel, and Rosenstock-Hussey) whose thought was significantly 
paralleled. 
6
  
 
 
    I first want to explain his idea of unity in reflection between art, religion, and science and 
the role of religion as not itself a ‘mental’ activity, but a symbolic action which is communal. 
However, as my concern here is with the relation of art to religion, I will not go into detail 
with Macmurray’s relation of science with art and religion. I will then examine the role of 
fear, death and spontaneity in his philosophy of personal relation. Art is crucial for the 
education of the emotions and, with religion, cultivating the spontaneous life and inspiring 
what ought to be. Macmurray’s conception of “the Hebrew consciousness”, founded upon the 
problematic human need to exist and express in community requires an interplay love and 
fear in personal relations. It is crucial then to emphasise the relation of Macmurray’s theory 
of “Withdrawal and Return” to Buber’s famous “bipolarity” of human existence, his I and 
Thou. For Buber, an understanding of faith in a tragic sense was integral to religious faith, for 
it is in “the tragedy of contradiction”, the “decisive turning” which through which one learns 
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to live their faith without depersonalising community or God.
7
 This chapter will conclude that 
Macmurray’s religious philosophy includes a dimension which challenges the illusory society 
and educates the emotions on the necessity of community.  
 
 
Art, Religion, and Science 
 
    In contemporary studies of Macmurray, the political implications
8
 of his philosophy of 
religion are duly noted as well as the connections he makes between political community and 
religion.
9
 However, it is interesting to note that his spheres of reflection ultimately do not 
include politics as a force in itself, but rather as growing out of the central spheres of 
reflection. Aesthetic reflection alone, as an education of emotion and training in judgement, 
cannot provide rules for the choice of ends because this is a matter of intuition and feeling, 
not of discursive thought. Art, in contrast to science, particularises, both the object 
contemplated and the contemplator.
 10
  Science refers to that activity where we are concerned 
with the world as stuff to be manipulated, as means to our ends. Science generalises, sees 
things as instances of a kind and as matters of fact. It has nothing to say about value.
 11
   
 
 
    At the heart of religion, however, there lies an activity of communion or fellowship. It is 
proper to speak of Christianity as a “religion” rather than to speak of a “religionless” Church, 
because true faith is concerned with the whole man.
12
 All members of the community are 
united in the same symbolic action, which is an expression and realisation of personal 
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relationship. There is a universal, immediate awareness of the need for human fellowship, 
and it is this awareness which gives rise to Faith. Religion establishes human relationship, in 
particular through what he calls “religious performance” 13 , and “it is only through the 
confusion with science or art that the validity of religion can be doubted.”14 Ultimately it is 
out of the “problematic of personal relations” that religious reflection can be of any validity. 
This chapter seeks primarily to explore how fear drives the conflicts of will in Macmurray’s 
thought, and, in conversation with our other ‘subjects’ (Unamuno and Bonhoeffer) how they 
may share similarities about the nature of the tragic in the 20
th
 Century religious landscape.  
 
Fear, Death and Spontaneity 
 
    As Macmurray continuously made mention throughout his life, his service in the First 
World War, which interrupted his study at Balliol College, Oxford, dramatically affected the 
future shape of his philosophy. His developing assumptions about the limitations of orthodox 
theology in the evangelical Calvinist tradition and “the notion of a theology developing by 
self-criticism”15 banished forever in him the “childish nonsense” of idealism16 and the “bad 
faith” inherent in organised Christianity.17  
 
 
    In Search for Reality in Religion he details his experiences of war—first as a nurse, then 
wounded at the battle of Arras in 1918—as a lesson in the human proximity of “the fear of 
death”.18 One notes that he italicises the word as to emphasise that the “familiarity of death”19 
and fear as a symbol of what is “destructive of reality”20 is a central subtext to his thought, 
found throughout his work. As long as the theme of death pervades within human experience, 
                                                          
13
 SRR, 58. 
 
14
 SRR, 69. 
 
15
 Macmurray (1965), Search for Reality in Religion. SCM Press, 15. 
 
16
 SRR, 19. 
 
17
 SRR, 23. 
 
18
 SRR, 18. 
 
19
 SRR, 17. 
 
20
 SRR, 18 
 76 
 
a religion which seeks to maintain a “purely spiritual” and thus “imaginary”21 approach to its 
relationship with the world, it fails to possess a transformative element. Fear, he states later, 
“is not an instinctive emotion which appears with the immediate threat of danger [i.e. the 
“here and now” fear of animals], but a pervasive attitude, referring to the whole range of 
possible danger which the foresight of rational knowledge reveals to consciousness.”22 
 
 
    Macmurray describes death as “the natural suppression of the activity” in which life 
consists. It is a universal reality which forces inactivity. Fear is the presence in a living 
consciousness of the suppression of the life activity.
23
 Spiritual death, is significantly a 
continuous dominance of a rational consciousness by fear, the pervasion of the mind by the 
death principle in life itself. It is the sense of constraint which reveals the loss of freedom and 
the sense of isolation which represents the loss of communion.
24
  When one lives with an 
overwhelming sense of the fear of life, life itself becomes inauthentic , illusory and devoid of 
activity. The fear of death is, in fact, the fear of life in which death is the ultimate danger. By 
representing death as life and life as death, rather than seeing these things as they actually are, 
one is robbed of the opportunity to grapple with new forms of fear which are due to the 
extension and deepening of the knowledge found in human progress.
25
 Fear reasserts itself as 
the fear of the unknown and is met, in pseudo-religion, by the assertion of the reality of the 
familiar and the established.
26
 
 
 
    The suppression of life and the profession of creeds which are based on illusion is for 
Macmurray a crucial factor in recognising true religion from Pseudo-religion.
27
 The greatest 
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ideological casualty in this hijacking of faith, in Macmurray’s view, is immortality because 
the denial of death implies an escape from fear:  
 
The affirmation of this may be an affirmation of the triumph of human life 
over fear, or it may be the expression of its retreat from fear to illusion…If 
the fear of death is the universal symbol of all human fear, one way of 
dealing with that fear and its effects must be to deny the reality of that 
which is feared…to deny the reality of death…is, in fact, the fear of life in 
which death is the ultimate danger.
28
 
 
    Macmurray argues that the suppression of human life by fear is a consequence of “a state 
of mind in which spontaneity has been overcome by fear and is held within it subservient to 
the defensive purposes of fear.”29 This is a reality in the Christian community because the 
experience of the Holy and the expression of the Holy are not always in conversation. When 
the experience of the Holy is suppressed, one can have the semblance of creative energy, but 
the reality is that it is far from creative or transformative.
30
 Later, we shall see Macmurray’s 
understanding of ‘withdrawal’ in personal relations characterised by fear which develops a 
view of the world which is ‘negative’ and ‘impersonal’. 
 
 
    The motive of fear can be either aggressive or acquiescent. When it is aggressive, 
individuals oppose, and sometimes even dominate, the object of the fear. They attempt to 
subordinate the object thereby “forcing” a “pragmatic” relationship that is incompatible with 
reflection.
31
 When the fear motive is acquiescent, individuals withdraw into themselves 
thereby becoming isolated from the dynamic relations within the world through which alone 
they can attain freedom.
32
 As it is the “synthesis” of all reflection, the “problematic” of 
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authentic religion, which lies in cultivating an integrated life, results in a “moral and 
spontaneous, and consequently, free” action.33  
 
 
    Christianity’s association through the ages with idealism has made Marxism understand 
the irrelevance of Christianity’s abstractions of “freedom and community in the absence of 
reality” 34 This is why, early in his philosophy, Macmurray felt that Communism, under his 
insistence that Marx “would have been justified in calling for the reform of religion but not 
for its rejection”,35 was a creative re-construction of an integrated life. As for the change in 
the nature of religious experience—the question “What is Christianity”36—as Macmurray 
comes to reject the Greek - Cartesian Idealist world, he cannot completely accept 
Kierkegaard’s radical individualism as an answer to the question, which whilst it cultivates a 
more autonomous being, does little for building community; One might argue, for 
Kierkegaard’s sake, that radical individualism did little to completely relieve him of fear. 
However, whilst Macmurray says the shape of his philosophical problem was shared with 
Kierkegaard, he links himself with Buber’s constructive existentialism.37 In speaking of the 
difference between good/bad faith and good/bad religion as the difference between a fear-
based life and a reflective life, he transcends Kierkegaard’s image of fear as “the dizziness of 
freedom”, by which human innocence is lost and the spontaneous life inherent in freedom 
succumbs.
38
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Art and Perception 
 
    Elizabeth “Betty” Campbell, Macmurray’s childhood sweetheart whom he eventually 
married on a brief leave from the battle of the Somme,
39
 was herself an accomplished 
musician and artist. It is with significant interest then that one of his earliest published work 
was a result of a symposium on aesthetics and the ‘chicken or egg’ question of apprehension 
or expression in art.
40
 Thus the first statement he makes on the reflective activities in human 
consciousness are on the assessment and appreciation of the experience of art, which he 
pleads to take inspiration from the “activity of the artist...in production”. It is not in the 
theoretical, abstract and disjointed questions of perspectives of what accounts for “beauty”, 
but rather in the essential “power” inherent in the artist’s activity: 
 
Is it that he is dowered with a more exquisite sensibility than ordinary 
mortals, through which he can perceive in the world around us wonders to 
which the mass of men are blind or deaf? Is it that he can teach us to see and 
hear what he sees and hears, to appreciate what he appreciates, to apprehend 
what he apprehends? Or is it rather that his apprehension is much the same 
as ours-a little keener perhaps by virtue of his training in observation, but 
essentially the same-yet that he is possessed of a magic gift whereby he 
transforms the common world which he shares with us into something finer 
and more satisfying? Does he show us the world of reality as it is, or does he 
recreate it for us as we should like it to be?
41
 
 
    Art, for Macmurray, is “expression” which grows out of “apprehension”. In visual art—
“that artistic activity [which] might seem most easily to be a matter of apprehension”— the 
painter or sculptor, etc. hardly ever constructs what they see in true reality or real time. 
“Ordinary perceptual experience”42 defies the real experiences of the one who lives in that 
experience. With subjective art, “There could not be a musician who was born deaf [or] a 
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painter who was born blind.” From the perspective of the Artist, “there are certain elements 
of the world which are more satisfying to perceive than others, directly and immediately, 
whether rightly or wrongly. In apprehending the world perceptually certain things are 
discovered to be more satisfying to perceive than others.”43 The artist, as they tend not to be 
“easily satisfied with the world as [the artist] finds it”44, has the potential to conceive more 
than the real world or the merely “informative” aspects of the world, but rather to penetrate 
one’s perceptual experience by creating “indifference” to reality. 
 
We recognise that it [a work of art] does represent a landscape or a person. 
Yet we are indifferent, and the artist is indifferent, to the particular 
landscape or the particular person depicted. We are content to know that it 
represents, without being concerned to know whether it represents 
something actual. We treat the picture, and the artist means us to treat it, as a 
hypothetical object of perception.
45
  
 
    The subject-matter or theme which arrests the attention of the producer of art is crucial to 
take notice of because, especially in cases where the ‘model’ is a “class-concept”, the goal is 
not a perfect duplication, but “away from an apprehension of actual imperfection.”46 The 
producer of art knows whatever message they are sending out through their work, it does not 
tell the full story, but at best tells a story which will grab the attention of those willing to be 
converted into its sphere. This means the production of art, whilst it may immediately and 
initially appeal to a particular sense, further experience of production may come to appeal to 
a union of senses, whether those sensations designate a sense of happiness/pleasure, or 
revilement.
47
   
 
 
    The effects of experience on one’s apprehension are considered within music as well. The 
musician’s point of departure is the world of “sound-objects” which may or may not 
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represent something natural or even pleasurable. “The gulf that seems to separate the sounds 
of the normal world from that of a Beethoven concerto does not arise from any peculiarity of 
the artistic activity in the musician, but simply from the empirical peculiarities of the sense of 
hearing.”48 Apprehension from our auditory senses can be deceiving because the process of 
making music or creating music to make is more “complex and confused”49, than, say, that 
which apprehends our eyes.  However, the apprehension through “repetition” is important to 
consider in auditory apprehension; one can only apprehend through the experiences of a 
performance, not simply one sitting. “Thus”, says Macmurray, “the case of music is 
essentially the same as that of painting” in that the presentation of it rests on the producers 
apprehension of things by perception, and upon their ability (“power”) to permit people to 
return to this theme again and again.
50
 
 
 
    Macmurray perceives then, that because art is “perceptual, not imaginary”51, and because it 
aims at its best to “provide the possibility of a hypothetical individual”, the production and 
grasping of the meaning of artistic elements are a matter of experience and expression. In this 
sense one cannot help but to be concerned primarily, not with criterion of art’s success or 
failure, its relation to assumptions about beauty, but rather the nature of art’s production. The 
“expression” is the expression of an individual object for apprehension. The artist expresses 
in order to apprehend and encourage apprehension. The apprehension which the art and artist 
makes possible “is itself an apprehension only of the possible and never of the Real.”52 
 
 
    Macmurray elaborates on these reflections concerning the limitedness and necessary 
“fragmentariness” of art and the artist in Reason and Emotion: 
 
Each artist is confined within the limits of his own acquaintance with the 
world, within his individual objectivity…Only the individuality of the 
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personal can be expressed by art; and since the experience of the individual 
is but a fragment of personal experience, his art can only express a fragment 
of the personal…but because of the vital relation between the artist and the 
object, between first and third persons in art…the work of each artist is a 
collection of separate works, each of which is self-contained and exclusive 
of all the others. They have no unity among themselves…This is the main 
reason for the assertion that art is not bound by morality, that it is not 
concerned with assessing right and wrong, that a novelist’s characters may 
all be vicious and feeble, that a painter’s subject may be morally degrading, 
without any detriment to the artistic value that it possesses.
 53 
 
 
When Macmurray speaks of ‘theology’, what he is most interested in ‘theologically’ is not on 
doctrine but on “the nature of faith” as history progresses. “Authority should be our guide and 
not our master; tradition should be our starting-point and not our resting place.”54  High 
Reason (knowledge/ judgement against faith) and mysticism (faith against knowledge) can at 
times be complementary forces, the abiding connection being ultimately the choice between 
the critical and un-critical comprehension of meaning. The instinctive (faith) explanation is 
not more likely to be correct than the argued judgement, because instinct is more prone to 
lack of accountability. However, judgement and instinct in unity best cultivates a creative, 
critical and deliberative mind.
55
 Knowledge for knowledge sake is an empty thing. Faith, 
instead of being an impediment to judgement, in fact sets it free to make it “a servant of 
creation”.56  
 
 
    Furthermore, without the practice of Art in unity with knowledge and faith, “sketching the 
outlines” of what “ought to be”,57 the world retains a detached and dualistic conception of 
life. He, with Unamuno and Bonhoeffer, admires not only the unity of reflection found in the 
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renaissance, but also the unity of reflection found which Darwin originally espoused as 
crucial to a revival interest of Renaissance thinking.
58
 A progressive society is at best a 
morality of laws and tradition whilst at the same time being a time of knowledge contained 
within that morality. In the meanwhile, art takes the perspective of onlooker and as an escape 
from reality; and religion is not religion at all, but rather lost in the “theatre” created by 
judgement’s superiority from any other means of reflection and action, looking “for a role 
that it may usurp.”59 Society cannot prevail on judgement alone or faith alone; faith is not 
knowledge, but without faith one loses “courage in the face of ignorance and insecurity, the 
refusal to be beaten by failure.”60 
 
 
The Hebrew Consciousness 
 
    The prophetic tradition best expresses for Macmurray, as it seems to for Bonhoeffer, the 
depth of the character in personal experience, more than individual experience but that sort of 
experience “built into the structure of humanity, which makes possible and necessitates 
“spiritual development”. Prophets cannot make good on their claims to have an objective 
knowledge of God;  however, the truth of subjective experience in the prophetic tradition are 
representations of the instinctual nature of humanity, however less it can measure up to hard 
facts.  
 
So long as the gap between the prophet’s conception of the divine nature 
and his knowledge of his own remains unfilled, so long religious belief 
must remain imprisoned in subjectivity. A concept of perfect personality 
which springs from the experience of imperfect personality and appeals 
in turn to the value-judgements of imperfect personality is a hypothesis 
which does not admit of verification. It must fall back, like its rival, upon 
the reiterated assertion of its origin in a divine revelation, which it in vain 
tries to indicate. But this is not enough. The opposition between the Law 
and the Prophets grows ever more radical. As the law increases its 
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strangle-hold upon the actualities of daily life, losing touch with spiritual 
development, so the ideal world withdraws more and more from contact 
with the remote. The prophetic vision loses its footing in history, and 
from its own aesthetic resources generates the picture of another world, 
confessedly remote from the sphere of our sorrow…even in this last 
phase the need of religion for a footing in history expresses itself by 
projecting the necessity of spiritual development into a real though 
distant future.
61
 
 
    So the religious consciousness, and particularly for Macmurray the Hebrew consciousness, 
is a more complete source of reflection than, say, the Roman “pragmatic” consciousness and 
the Greek “contemplative” consciousness, as he discusses in The Clue to History.62 It is the 
former ancient expressions of culture which have been expressed in European history and, 
thus, the dualistic tendencies of Western thought are largely the consequence of the 
distinctions between culture and art which have left the religious expressions of reflection 
and action in a race to ‘look for a place which it can usurp’.63 In particular, Macmurray is 
concerned that the Greek consciousness—the conservatism of its politics, the empiricism of 
her philosophy, but much more so in the air of “completeness” in her aesthetics, has too 
naively been a dominating factor in the Modern consciousness.
64
  
 
…it is in the world of art that the Greek consciousness finds its natural 
expression, and that in seeking to achieve an all-inclusive vision, it succeeds 
in raising questions which it cannot answer. A reality which is incapable of 
including action is a reality which is incomplete…Its picture of reality can 
only be achieved through the denial of the reality of action. For action 
demands incompleteness in the world.
65
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    For Macmurray, an understanding of the essential “Jewishness” of Christianity provides 
one with a “primitive” understanding of human consciousness as one built on ‘non-assertive’ 
notion of community. This primitive religious consciousness tends to break into 
classifications as religion develops; this is the very type history recorded, Macmurray notes, 
in the Old Testament. “We can understand the meaning of this by noticing that primitive 
society is religious in form precisely because the elements of culture which represent the 
origins of art, science, morality, law and politics, have no autonomy. They are contained in 
religion and remain aspects of it.”66  
 
 
    When the autonomy of one aspect of consciousness rules over the others, the completeness 
of the human experience is lost.
67
   Macmurray makes clear that this does not mean religion is 
decidedly “totalitarian” but rather forms the “paradoxical” basis of human consciousness—
“If a society (or an individual has a religion it is not religious. If it is religious it cannot have 
a religion.” The point of religious consciousness is to provide such a ‘comprehensive’ way of 
understanding the world that would prevent an “atomising” and thus a distinguishing 
paradigm between reflection and action; rather, “the religious consciousness makes the life of 
reflection an essential element in action.”68 
 
 
    In Hebrew history, dualism presented itself in the development of the position of priests, 
and the prophetic tradition rises as a resistance of this atomising of human consciousness. 
The one “without social authority” is the inspiration for religious consciousness, the exponent 
of contemporary ‘meaning’ of this comprehensive primitive consciousness. 69  It is the 
“abnormal” consciousness, a conflict to society as it exists that is characteristic of the 
religious consciousness. In saying that “the belief in God is not in itself a criterion of the 
religious consciousness”, he counts Atheism not as a construction of a consciousness 
                                                          
66
 CTH, 28. 
 
67
 Ibid. 
 
68
 CTH, 29-30. 
 
69
 CTH, 32. 
 
 86 
 
completely separate from that of religion, but as an abnormal consciousness in itself and thus 
part of this primitive consciousness which seeks to revive a true sense of personhood.
70
 
 
 
God as ‘Worker’  
 
    Macmurray’s later development of ‘Person as Agent’ develops from his earlier conception 
of “God as worker”: 
 
What is characteristic of Hebrew conception of God is that God is a worker. 
In the dualist forms of consciousness, God always appears as an aristocrat. 
As Creator, Jehovah works for six days in the making of the world…the 
primary closeness of the relationship between [God and humanity] made in 
God’s likeness, remains, is reinforced, and is constantly recovered in the 
prophetic movement. So, when Jesus asserts the fatherhood of God, and re-
establishes the close relationship between God and man, that is the 
outstanding feature of his teaching about God, he is reasserting and 
deepening the traditional Hebrew conception, not breaking away from it. 
Nothing could express more succinctly the essence of the Hebrew 
conception of god in its full religious integrity, than the statement attributed 
to Jesus, “My father worketh hitherto, and I work.”71   
 
    One may deduce that this “worker” concept to God is heavily inspired by his interest—in 
the 1930s—of the moral and theological implications of communism. His intellectual 
involvement in the British communist movement in his early career may give too strong an 
impression that he was more interested in political philosophy than religious thought or 
aesthetics. But in his most important statement on Communism at this time, CS (1935), he 
makes clear that his interest in Marxist politics comes largely on what it supposedly achieves 
practically versus the “vague” focus in conventional Christianity of emotion and ideas.72  
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    Marxist historicism, which makes one “feel himself to be an instrument through which [the 
process of history] is here and now achieving its purpose of creating a true and universal 
society in the world,” is, at least, a fair definition of the ‘Kingdom of Heaven’ on earth for 
Macmurray. Communism achieves something that the Christianity of Macmurray’s day failed 
to: essentially create and cultivate a “faith” in unity not marked by professions but by 
action.
73
 Rather than accepting an absolute Communist position based on an absolute 
atheism—which as we have seen above Macmurray never thought possible because atheism 
is at best an expression of the abnormal consciousness necessary to revive faith—Macmurray 
suggests that Communism too is a ‘wake-up call’ to the consciousness of faith, a call away 
from “the fear of isolation”. “Pseudo-religion”, in contrast to the fundamental aspects of 
religion, atheism and Communism, signifies the pervasive development of fear and 
isolation.
74
 This, then, permits the suppression of action in the name of ‘religion’.  
 
 
    After the horrors of the Stalin-era became revealed, Macmurray only edited a few of his 
works, including Reason and Emotion, thus developing further the conception of “person as 
agent” beyond a pro-Soviet thought, yet still unashamedly inspired by the Marxist attack on 
idealism and popular religion as the essence of idealism.
75
 Macmurray was more interested in 
Marx’s critique for distinguishing real from illusory religion. He felt that the spiritualism and 
pietistic sympathies which popular Christianity adopted was bereft of the sense of collective 
responsibility, which was at best theoretically manifested in Marxism: 
 
A purely spiritual religion is necessarily an idealist religion, and so unreal. 
For the purely spiritual is the purely imaginary. It seemed, indeed, that 
modern Communism might well be that half of Christianity which had been 
dropped by the Church in favour of an accommodation with Rome [empire], 
coming back to assert itself against the part that had been retained.
76
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    It was this same pietism from which Bonhoeffer withdrew himself, and from which 
Unamuno departed in his search for a more practical sense of ‘immortality’. And it can be 
adequately assumed through his use of the word “Religion” that he continues to view the 
Christian consciousness in concert with the Hebrew consciousness, though his focus on the 
unity of reflection is not as intrinsically marked with theological interpretation in his later 
works. This is perhaps because, rather than seeing unity of reflection and its problematic in 
the development of personality as an intrinsically theological quest, it is ultimately an 
‘organic’ recovery of human consciousness in its most honest form. The process away from 
organic humanity is parallel to an “inartistic”, “impersonal”, “unreal” civilisation. For 
Macmurray, Modernity, rather than a signification of progress, was the uncovering of the 
real, “a loss of spiritual integrity, a slowing down of the pulses of the inner life” through an 
absolute emphasis on the outer life. This isn’t social development for Macmurray; it was the 
paralysis of civilisation.
77
  
 
 
Withdrawal and Return 
 
    The negative language abundant in Macmurray’s thought, of course, does not in itself 
reveal completely with his concern for the inevitability of conflict in human consciousness 
and community. The true sense of “unity” in life, and therefore Macmurray’s alternative to 
dualism is best represented in his living familial metaphor he calls “the rhythm of withdrawal 
and return” in his Gifford lectures. McIntosh makes clear that Macmurray’s alternative is not 
to be confused with a monist response to dualism, where mental phenomena are unified with 
physical phenomena.
78
  Macmurray’s central assumption, according to McIntosh, is that he 
does not need to “prove” or propose the existence of physical and mental states, nor free will 
in order to come to his primacy of the practical. Like Unamuno and Bonhoeffer, for 
Macmurray a “system” is, at best, secondary to the wholeness of human experience.79  
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    The relation between infant and parent—the “differentiation of the Other”—is the 
difference between the respective instincts of caring and the necessity of being cared for. The 
infant and the adult share status as an active ‘person’ with actual rationality, rather than mere 
“potential” actuality.80 The first knowledge for the infant is knowledge of the personal Other 
with whom one is in communication, “who responds to my cry and cares for me.”81  With 
this in mind, Macmurray asserts that in the unity between infant and parent by virtue of 
reason, there lies the contradiction in agency. He notes how the personality of the child is 
very simple and vulnerable, a life of “helpless dependence” in comparison with that of the 
Parent which is complex due to the development of Reason and that “this makes it easier to 
apprehend the universal form which distinguishes the personal from the organic.”82   
 
 
    The negative aspect—the withdrawal—of personal relation is the inevitability of fear and 
anxiety, when the Parent must relinquish control or care, thus diminishing the Child’s 
anticipation to be cared for. When this happens:  
 
The constants of the Child’s experience of the world have disappeared; his 
anticipations have not been verified. His predictions are still, as it were, 
dogmas; he has not yet learned to treat them as hypotheses. The formula of 
his confidence is ‘this or nothing’. So he faces what is for him the ultimate 
threat to his existence—isolation from the Other by the act of the Other.83     
 
    The perpetuation of the withdrawal brings the child to discover the difference between 
them and the parent, and thus “self-assertion”—or as it has been commonly called, the Will—
begins to develop. When the child’s needs and differences are discovered, self-consciousness 
and “personal individuality” and self-identity is cultivated.84 Thus Macmurray’s primary idea 
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is that, in contrast to the “solitary” Cartesian self, human beings are born dependent on 
relationships. We start ‘thinking’ about it as we experience the problem of difference and 
become increasingly self-sufficient. From the point of difference and awareness, the child 
becomes more aware of the choices and possibilities for future action.
85
 The positive 
motive—the return—develops in the child realising a need to be cared for in the world and 
embracing a certain “trust” in the Other.86 This trust is at best a manifestation of the child’s 
awareness of being loved. 
 
 
    The consistency in action found between the positive and negative modes of motivation is 
‘fear’ and ‘love’. 87  When fear and love are seen as a ‘unity’ rather than ‘enemies’, 
development is cultivated. Love needs fear in order to cause action; fear, at its best in 
communion with love, encourages reflection on possibilities, thus enabling “the most suitable 
course of action for the fulfilment” of intent.88 
 
Macmurray, Buber and Tragic Consciousness 
 
    The type of personhood to which Macmurray seeks to articulate in the world then is a 
conflict of wills. It is crucial then to emphasise the relation of Macmurray’s theory of 
Withdrawal and return to Martin Buber’s famous “bipolarity” of human existence, his I and 
Thou. Esther McIntosh affirms this conflictual rhythm: “…not only is the existence of the 
other a given when we start with agency, it is also a fact of human survival. From conception 
we depend on another person for our existence. As we grow to adulthood we do not become 
independent beings, but interdependent persons; we live as members of communities. This 
does not mean that the individual is obscured by the community; rather, the interdependent 
relation is one in which the other person acts both as a support and as opposition.”89  
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    For Buber this call to human connection and relation was inclusive of plant and animal life. 
Thus, mutuality for Buber is dependent on whether an object is appreciated in itself or is 
appreciated only as a means to an end.
90
 This was grounded in a sense of tragedy. Tragedy is 
the struggle toward the redemption from evil. Martin Friedman states that, for Buber, an 
understanding of faith in a tragic sense was integral to religious faith, for it is in “the tragedy 
of contradiction”, the “decisive turning91” which comes with the break through from I-Thou 
to I-It that oneness and freedom are recovered
92
.  
 
 
    Tragedy for Buber was the essential poetic representation of human dialogue, and thus 
tragedy is the essential form of drama. The transformative element of drama-the play of life- 
does not come into being without dialogue, and real dialogue cannot manifest itself without 
an audience, “the appearance of spectators. This appearance is not to be understood as 
something that took place all at once and unequivocally, but as the result of a long 
development, or rather entanglement. Each transformation play took place originally; indeed, 
not for its own sake but for the magical aim of achieving in the received form what the 
community needed.”93  
 
 
    Judaism’s impact on the world was not “that it failed to experience ‘the tragedy’, the 
contradiction in the world’s process, deeply enough; but rather that it experienced the 
contradiction as theophany”.94 Coming to grips with the complexity of the world and of one’s 
experience of it is the essence of Yihud
95
 --the risk of ordinary life—which “does not take 
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place through creedal profession or magic manipulation, but through the concrete meeting of 
I and Thou by which the profane is sanctified and the mundane hallowed.”96  Theophany by a 
sense of the tragic demands that one look Reality in the face without fear, affirming the tragic 
without sentimentality and working in it and through it.
97
  
 
 
 
    Similar to Buber, Macmurray asserts that it is in the negative moment in personal 
experience, the struggle between mother and child, action becomes necessary and the 
problematic of human experience becomes an opportunity for resolution and reconciliation.
98
 
There is the choice between egocentrism (when the relationship has not been resolved 
whether “forced back in to co-operative activity” or wilfully suppressed)99 and reconciliation. 
In the “transformation” from thinking to action, one “restores the reference of thought to 
action, and in the result find that we are driven to conceive a personal universe in which God 
is the ultimate reality.”100  
 
 
Conclusion 
 
    John Macmurray, read through the lens of his contemporaries, conceives the problematic 
push and pull (withdrawal and return) between false Absolutes which can no longer sustain 
community, and the mutuality of personhood which helps to frame new conceptions of 
community and selfhood. Macmurray adds a third dimension to the problematic of personal 
relations by distinguishing the artistic element in reflection, ensuring that persons can 
actually “enjoy mutuality”.101 Macmurray, in this instance, describes in this philosophy of 
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personalism what has been the virtual tug and pull of international relations in a 20
th
 century 
climate which had to create virtually from scratch new ways of being persons after the logic 
and sociality of an imperial dominated culture in Europe. Macmurray’s personalism is a 
conception of ‘emerging community’ which all three thinkers we have studied here have been 
concerned with, sought to express and to be expressed in artistic elements of Christian 
community in particular. Ultimately is a concern for the sustaining and characterising the 
meaning and depth of community in a 21
st
 century climate where the very idea of community, 
religious and otherwise, is under crisis and in need of re-framing. How best does the 
Christian community affirm the stage of personal relations reaffirming Mystery beyond 
“nonsense”?102 
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CONCLUSION 
 
Who stands firm? Only the one for whom the final standard is not his reason, 
his principles, his conscience, his freedom, his virtue, but who is ready to 
sacrifice all these, when in faith and sole allegiance to God he is called to 
obedient and responsible action: the responsible person, whose life will be 
nothing but an answer to God’s question and call.1 
Everyone carries a shadow, and the less it is embodied in the individual's 
conscious life, the blacker and denser it is. If an inferiority is conscious, one 
always has a chance to correct it. Furthermore, it is constantly in contact with 
other interests, so that it is continually subjected to modifications. But if it is 
repressed and isolated from consciousness, it never gets corrected.
2
 
 
    The vision which Unamuno, Bonhoeffer, and Macmurray share in their interpretation of 
Christianity is one in which their experiences of tradition are on an irrecoverably shaky 
ground, precipitated by the dramatic end of imperial Europe, the horror of war, and the 
pursuit of the identity in the midst of it all. It seems to be that it is in “the deafening” of the 
human spirit which occurs at the point of traumatic finality — that point of certain 
nothingness which gives rise to a recovery of the self — with which Unamuno, Bonhoeffer 
and Macmurray offer vision on the nature of faith in the state of war and the conflict of 
human relationships.   
 
     The departure of Unamuno, Bonhoeffer and Macmurray from the dualist perspective 
which dominated European thought until the First World War, and which threatened the 
move toward a holistic perspective to the self, is the perennial ‘tragedy’ which is the 
unavoidable encounter of human experience with “the deafenings unsaid” and which fear 
prevents one from encountering. Tragedy shares an affinity for the “telling of” suffering and 
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evil and the responsive action out of suffering and evil. Kathleen Sands suggests that tragedy 
be seen in light of the ‘trauma’ of history.  
 
Tragedies are to history as trauma is to time. Traumas interrupt time; they are 
black holes, not just potholes, in the journey. This is their finality, the feeling 
of "the end" that circumscribes and sanctifies every profound loss. Yet 
traumatic finality, just because it feels so absolute, remains unfinished, a "lump 
in the spirit." It cannot be spun into the fabric of meaning, and so manifests 
itself as gap or silence. And because it cannot be integrated or expressed, 
trauma demands re-enactment… Tragedy ought to uncover the grief and the 
pleasure; ought to be, in other words, not a symptom of melancholia but a 
vehicle for its healing. And even for its detractors, tragedy tends to return, just 
as it returns in the lamenting of its loss.
3
 
 
Whilst tragedy has had an elusive and subtle relationship to Christian thought, the work of 
Unamuno, Bonhoeffer, and Macmurray represent an ‘ecumenical’ view in the 20th century — 
contrary to their contemporaries — that far from being the stuff of antiquity or even of 
irrelevance to the nature of religious experience, the sense of the tragic very much epitomizes 
the struggle of Modern 21
st
 Century Christian imagination to act faithfully given the trauma 
of existence, decline in influence and doubt of the masses, and believing in hope and 
redemption, attempting to share our experience with a secular world. It has been important to 
emphasise war, the socio-political consequences of philosophical dualism, and theological 
triumphalism as a common backdrop these thinkers share as indicative of the precariousness 
of life. As war is a central ontological background, the experience of war also suggests how 
they in conversation help us to conceive of a broader theology of personhood and creativity. 
 
    The dominant Aristotelian idea of the ‘tragic hero’, the political figure brought down by 
his own immorality, was in the 20
th
 century, eclipsed by the sense of ‘trauma’ inherent in 
inevitable existential encounter that is the fate of every human being. That this sense of 
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existence has deeply spiritual implications is a phenomenon which Miguel de Unamuno was 
a forerunner. In the diversity of Unamuno’s aesthetic language as novelist, poet and 
philosopher, the crisis of faith and the theological dimensions of the chaos of social 
breakdown are crucial to uncovering the liminality of existence. His concept of intrahistoria, 
then, is a central theme in his attempt at deconstructing fixed ideas of faith’s relation to the 
personal and cultural dimensions of life, reconstructing in the process the “agonic” journey 
which comes in the practice of faith.   
 
    In the work of Bonhoeffer we discovered that the concept of tragedy was itself an 
unresolved theme in his ideas on suffering; his later reflections on Greek tragedy, which he 
sees as irreconcilable with a “transcendent” Christology, are juxtaposed with his earlier 
public lectures and sermons in which he reflects on the tragic nature of the Hebrew prophets, 
and how they relate to his historical context. In his reflection on music as well, Bonhoeffer 
thought it was important to distinguish between musical “artifice” and music which best 
represents “mature worldliness”. Thus, Bonhoeffer’s aversion to neoclassicism, the aesthetic 
of German Pietism, and a parallel interest in the music of the Renaissance and in the African 
American spirituals is an important resource for his theology, none the least because in a 
mature worldliness one approaches the Real in the unity of darkness with light, and the 
consciousness of the perpetuity of one’s choices for subsequent generations.  
 
   As Bonhoeffer’s development of a Christian perspective to the tragic included the 
confrontation with mutuality and responsibility, so Macmurray’s as well asserts the problem 
of the personal. I have taken for granted that Macmurray, as a philosopher in the Christian 
tradition and as an advocate of the Hebrew consciousness inherent in Christianity, shares 
similar ideas to his contemporary Martin Buber. As Macmurray has emphasised, Greco-
Roman thought was the cultural dominant of Western thought shaping not only the 
cultivation of ideas of community, but also giving a disproportionate glory to antiquity which 
shaped art and religion. It was this rejection of the tragic sense of Christianity which 
cultivated the ‘determinist’ language which is so dominant in orthodox Christian aesthetic. 
Thus Jesus Christ, the ‘superhero’ of classical Christian narrative and thus Western culture, 
could not be associated with the classical tragic figures of antiquity. In shaping a philosophy 
of human relations very much influenced by what he called the Hebrew consciousness, 
96 
 
Macmurray would readily be in concert Buber’s understanding of the ‘I-Thou’ dynamic as 
the essence of a tragic trajectory in shaping community. As an alternative to the triumphalism 
of Western Christianity, the sense of the tragic is the essence of dialogue: the perpetual death 
of assumptions and fear, and the birth of redemption.  
 
    Unamuno, Bonhoeffer, and Macmurray represent the departure of a classical, dualist 
interpretation of Christian thought, one where Christianity has an intimate relationship to 
history and thus the creative contradictions which shape community. Rather than being a 
stumbling block to faith, this is a source for discovering the essence of ‘mystery’ in personal 
relation, or, as Martin Foss asserts, “the mystery and complexity of the human situation and 
man’s embeddedness in a wider life.”4 Today, with the Church serving no longer as the prime 
mediator of culture, her theology and aesthetic must resemble an integrative trajectory where 
the drama of paradox is ever unfolding and being apprehended with integrity by people of 
faith.  
   Their understanding of the tensions between ‘status quo’ and the marginal are influenced by 
their embrace of the tragic, and a rather than being outside the box with no particular place to 
go, they sought to shape a new social order ready to be grasped when the trauma of the ‘old 
world’ passes away. The dialogue of faith with the world, for them, aims to embrace the 
tensions in the world without making Christianity subservient to the world—it is, in the 
words of Christ and the Apostle Paul, to ‘be in the world but not of the world”.5  
 
Through the shared vision of Unamuno, Bonhoeffer and Macmurray, we find that a sense 
of the tragic is crucial to the contemporary Christian imagination to confront the myths and 
the ‘demons’ which pervade the immediate assumptions of the “spectators” of faith and 
history. The century since the summer of 1914 and the spawn of ‘The Great War’ which 
affects us still today, continues to leave hard lessons for us to learn. There are, indeed, 
spiritual, cultural and ideological shadows which remain with us, and we are invited to be 
players and spectators. The agonic from a Christian context can be cultivated by the constant 
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awareness that we are subject to what Iris Murdoch calls the sentiment of “void”6: forces 
which withdraw us from our immediate world, our own individual peace; the dark shadows.  
  
The agonic within the “Abrahamic” faith—the faith narratives, dialogue and rituals which 
individually and collectively be exchanged between Jews, Christians and followers of 
Islam—can serve, for those subjected to it, is still a beautiful and ominous pedagogy for the 
world. Those who living within this Faith are often called upon to welcome the language of 
suffering and tragedy into our worship because of its proximity to us. However difficult and 
painful it is, it is never left without its meaning. We come to see that we, like all, are frail, 
vulnerable, needy. Virtue and “piety” is then known for what it is: pointless, yet genuine and 
creative. A theology where all things are “bright and beautiful” is not as realistic or as formed 
out of agony as is a theology which asserts “Steal away…I ain’t got long to stay here”.  
 
Any story – whether written, spoken, sung, or created by hand, mind and heart – that 
would embody this thread of spiritual creativity must speak of the epistemic darkness, the 
precariousness of life, and the austere revelations of this moral journey. In Reformed 
Christian worship, this recognition is often expressed in a congregational “Confession”. The 
African American Churches in which I grew up and discovered ‘faith’ used individual 
“Testimony” in worship as a form of existential purging. The hope embedded in this is to 
recognise this sentiment of angst ad tragedy more readily as the nature of religious 
experience, and live in its value.  
 
These were theologians set on living and expressing the story of their faith, in all its passion 
and agony. In an era where the western Christian community is more preoccupied with our 
relative decline, and remaining ‘open’ to the world (if not relevant), we may be more tempted 
on exploring the ‘sweetness and light’ side of our faith in effort to show a ‘radical welcome’ 
rather than confronting and being grounded by those negative emotions which will call a 
community to faithfulness and even healing of individuals and beyond. Martin Buber 
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recovers the tragic pervasiveness in Jewish thought as crucial to the “redemption of evil”7: 
“We cannot recover the soil of tragedy, but in real meeting we can reach the soil of salvation 
after the tragedy has been completed.” 8  The creative event which is the foundation of 
“Abrahamic” faith, Christianity in particular, warrants a constant re-evaluation of all that 
encompasses human experience. In taking seriously the need to re-affirm the meaning of 
community in yet another age of depersonalised human relations, where once again the future 
of democratic ideals are being questioned, a “reformed and ever reforming” practical 
Christian theology is obliged to take notice of the divergent manifestations of subversive 
human experience, draw beads from it, and discover and create motifs of spiritual 
transformation—even new orders of manifesting community — from them.    
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
7
 See M. Friedman (1955), Martin Buber: The Life of Dialogue. New York: Harper and Co., 133-148.  
 
8
 Quoted in Friedman, Ibid. 
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